Essays On Fertility And The Demographic Dividend In Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring The Puzzles And Posibilities by Utah-Adjibola, Amarachi
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2018
Essays On Fertility And The Demographic
Dividend In Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring The
Puzzles And Posibilities
Amarachi Utah-Adjibola
University of Pennsylvania, autah@sas.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Demography, Population, and Ecology Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2934
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Utah-Adjibola, Amarachi, "Essays On Fertility And The Demographic Dividend In Sub-Saharan Africa: Exploring The Puzzles And
Posibilities" (2018). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2934.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2934
Essays On Fertility And The Demographic Dividend In Sub-Saharan
Africa: Exploring The Puzzles And Posibilities
Abstract
The phenomenon of the “demographic dividend” in Africa has become a source of considerable and vigorous
public discourse in both policy and academic spheres over the last two decades. A growing body of research
explores this phenomenon in the African context, tying its occurrence to a variety of demographic transitional
factors popular among which are fertility and dynamic population age structures. In three essays, this
dissertation explores the demographic dividend in cross section of sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries with
emphasis on the fertility transition as it relates to other demographic and economic parameters. In the first
essay, I investigate the relationship between the decelerating pace of fertility decline and economic growth in
seven SSA countries using a random effects growth model. I find that stalled fertility decline has a consistently,
statistically significant negative effect on economic growth.
In the second essay, I use age-specific National Transfer Accounts data to estimate the support ratio and
demographic dividend for the period 1970 through 2100, and decompose the difference in the support ratio
components estimated for all the countries using Nigeria; the earliest-transition country in the sample as my
baseline. By departing from the use of conventional, fixed age-limits to define the support ratio, I improve on
the accuracy of prior support ratio estimates, and with my decomposition, I provide a new and comprehensive
view of the component contributions of economic versus demographic behavior to the overall dividend.
In the third essay, I focus on the dividend in Malawi. Malawi is an interesting case-study because until recently
the potential for a dividend has been negligible. However, recent, accelerated fertility decline may signal
improved potential for growth. Generating probabilistic fertility and population projections for Malawi, and
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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON FERTILITY AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: 
EXPLORING THE PUZZLES AND POSSIBILITIES 
 
Amarachi Utah-Adjibola 
Hans-Peter Kohler 
 
The phenomenon of the “demographic dividend” in Africa has become a source of considerable 
and vigorous public discourse in both policy and academic spheres over the last two decades. A 
growing body of research explores this phenomenon in the African context, tying its occurrence to 
a variety of demographic transitional factors popular among which are fertility and dynamic 
population age structures. In three essays, this dissertation explores the demographic dividend in 
cross section of sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries with emphasis on the fertility transition as it 
relates to other demographic and economic parameters. In the first essay, I investigate the 
relationship between the decelerating pace of fertility decline and economic growth in seven SSA 
countries using a random effects growth model. I find that stalled fertility decline has a 
consistently, statistically significant negative effect on economic growth.  
In the second essay, I use age-specific National Transfer Accounts data to estimate the 
support ratio and demographic dividend for the period 1970 through 2100, and decompose the 
difference in the support ratio components estimated for all the countries using Nigeria; the 
earliest-transition country in the sample as my baseline. By departing from the use of 
conventional, fixed age-limits to define the support ratio, I improve on the accuracy of prior 
support ratio estimates, and with my decomposition, I provide a new and comprehensive view of 
the component contributions of economic versus demographic behavior to the overall dividend.  
In the third essay, I focus on the dividend in Malawi. Malawi is an interesting case-study 
because until recently the potential for a dividend has been negligible. However, recent, 
accelerated fertility decline may signal improved potential for growth. Generating probabilistic 
fertility and population projections for Malawi, and using an economic-demographic simulation 
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model to assess the dividend prospects given historical and current fertility patterns, I find that the 
recent steep fertility declines in Malawi do bode well for the country’s dividend future. The results 
in this dissertation help demystify the demographic dividend phenomenon in Africa, extends the 
literature, and lays the groundwork for policy focused on making the dream of a demographic 
dividend a reality. 
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PREFACE  
The demographic transition is a series of fortunate events beginning with declining 
mortality followed, after a brief time-lag, by declining fertility. In the interval between mortality and 
fertility decline there is a temporary population growth spurt that causes a shift in the population 
age structure. This shift is due to the fact that mortality decline, usually concentrated around 
lower ages, results in a greater proportion of surviving children. The result of this shift, is a 
population age structure dominated by young people. Over time this bulk youth cohorts age into 
working status, and begin to function at optimal production, saving and investment capacity -- 
consuming less and producing much more than younger and older cohorts who now represent a 
relatively smaller proportion of the population. Output per capita receives a boost; which 
combined with sound macroeconomic, health and education policy, causes a rise in overall 
economic growth. The contribution of the preceding demographic dynamics to subsequent 
economic growth is the demographic dividend (Williamson and Higgins 2001; Bloom, Canning 
and Sevilla 2003; Ronald Lee; 2003 Canning, Raja, and Yazbeck 2015). 
There are in fact two possible demographic dividends. The first, which is described above 
is transitory in nature. The same factors that bring the first dividend to an end cause the second 
to begin. Faced with increased life expectancy, working age cohorts accumulate wealth in the 
form of savings and transfers as a way of ensuring old age livelihood. Additionally, lower fertility is 
accompanied by increased investment in child education and health. The combination of 
increased financial and human capital creates a pathway for a more permanent rise in income per 
capita. This is the second demographic dividend. The present endeavor in its entirety however, 
focuses only on the first demographic dividend and all references to the dividend going forward 
relate only to the first demographic dividend. 
Research on the demographic dividend grew in popularity after a 1998 study by Bloom 
and Williamson where the authors show that age structure changes account for as much as one-
third of the East Asian “miracle” economic growth. Using a widely accepted econometric 
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approach to model the relationship between age structure and growth, their model has its basis in 
the standard conditional convergence framework, and has been followed closely by many 
subsequent studies. Incorporating standard determinants of economic growth, their results 
confirm that there is indeed a strong relationship between demographic variables and economic 
growth, and that the effect is a transitional one (Bloom and Williamson, 1998). Following the 1998 
study, Bloom, Canning and Malaney (2000) also explore demographic change and economic 
growth in Asia, and expand the 1998 analysis to include additional demographic growth 
determinants; life expectancy and population density. Here also, they conclude that demographic 
factors play a significant role in East Asia’s rapid economic growth, and that the demographic 
transition can potentially serve as an accelerator to growth. 
A large swathe of the developed world has achieved post-transitional status. This status 
is characterized by high levels of education, healthcare, and female labor force participation, and 
a fertility rate of approximately two children per woman. However, this status does not define 
most of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Many SSA countries have begun to transition, and have 
experienced steady declines in mortality. However, the fertility portion of the transition in SSA is 
unfolding in a unique manner; one that significantly differs from the patterns observed across 
other regional contexts particularly in terms of its pace and magnitude. These unusual patterns 
are viewed as a problem by policy-makers in the region, primarily because evidence has shown 
that there is an economic benefit to be derived from a demographic transition that follows the 
conventional path.  
This study is an exploration of the demographic dividend in SSA. In Chapter 1, using a 
sub-sample of seven mid/late-transition SSA countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa), and a conventional growth model, I assess the impact of a 
decelerating or stalling pace of fertility decline on economic growth. Accounting for a set of 
widely-accepted growth determinants, I assess the effect of stalling fertility decline alongside key 
variables measuring demographic dynamics and alternative dividend determinants like education.  
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In Chapter 2, I expand my analysis of the dividend in SSA by projecting the support ratio 
and demographic dividend for the period 1970 through 2100 using the same sample of countries, 
and compare results across countries. In this chapter, I innovate on existing literature primarily by 
using new National Transfer Accounts (NTA) data to estimate the support ratio. Rather than 
estimating the proportion of worker versus consumers using fixed age-limits (as previous studies 
have done), I estimate support ratios with NTA age profiles of consumption and production; using 
these age profiles, I determine the proportion of effective producers/workers versus consumers in 
the population. The countries in my sample are the only countries for which NTA data has been 
generated and they make for an interesting comparative analysis as they present different 
contexts in terms of economic profile and demographic transitional status. Also in Chapter 2, I 
decompose the difference in the support ratio components estimated for all the countries using 
Nigeria; the earliest-transition country in the sample as my baseline. This analysis allows me to 
highlight the relative contribution of demographic behavior (mortality and fertility) versus 
economic behavior (production and consumption captured in the support ratio variable) to the 
overall dividend.  
In Chapter 3, I move from cross-country comparisons to a case-study of the demographic 
transition and its impact on economic growth in a single country—Malawi. Malawi is of particular 
interest here, because where the promise of a demographic dividend had previously been marred 
by a sluggish transitional history, recent steep declines in fertility may be able to offset some of 
the negative effects of the demographic past and significantly alter the trajectory of the dividend 
future in Malawi. In this chapter, using historical and current fertility estimates, I estimate new 
probabilistic projections of total fertility rate and life expectancy which I use to generate projected 
population in Malawi through 2100. These estimates are an improvement on prior 2015 UN 
projection estimates as they account for true uncertainty. Then, using an economic-demographic 
simulation model, I assess the effects of fertility, operating through a series of channels, on 
economic growth in Malawi, and assess the future prospects for a demographic dividend.
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                                                    
FERTILITY AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND:                                                  
IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA  
 
1.1 Overview 
 
The fertility transition has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Research has 
demonstrated that fertility declines play a significant role in the development of the population age 
structure needed to produce a demographic dividend (Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla, 2003; Bloom, 
Canning, Fink, & Finlay, 2007, 2010).  With fewer children, parents may be able to invest more 
resources on child health and education (Becker, Duesenberry, & Okun, 1960; Becker & Lewis, 
1973; Bloom et al., 2010), and mothers may be able to invest more resources in their own 
education and participate more actively in the labor force (Bloom, Canning, Fink, & Finlay, 2009). 
This increased human capital produced by lower fertility could potentially improve overall 
productivity at the country-level, enhance savings and investment behavior, and expand available 
resources for economic development (Canning, Karra & Wilde, 2014). 
While the fertility transition has begun across most of sub-Saharan Africa (hereinafter 
SSA), it is proceeding a much slower rate than many of its regional counterparts. There is 
significant variation in the timing, magnitude and prevalence of decline between countries, and 
incidences of stalling and even increasing fertility have been recorded in some early and mid-
transition countries (Caldwell, Orubuloye, & Caldwell 1992; Cleland, Onuoha, & Timaeus 1994; 
Cohen 1998; Kirk & Pillet 1998; Timaeus & Moultrie 2008; Garenne 2008; Shapiro & 
Gebreselassie 2008; Schoumaker 2009; Ezeh, Mberu, & Emina 2009; Machiyama 2010; 
Bongaarts 2008; Bongaarts & Casterline 2013, Gerland, Biddlecom & Kantorova 2016). This has 
been a source of increasing concern among African policymakers; who worry that an 
unpredictable fertility transition characterized by intermittent fertility declines (despite relatively 
low mortality rates), could negatively impact the population age structure and limit the potential for 
a demographic dividend in the region (Eastwood & Lipton 2011).  
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A few studies have examined the effect of fertility decline on economic growth using 
growth regressions and micro-level data to explore the relationship (Joshi & Schultz, 2007; Miller, 
2010; Canning, Karra & Wilde, 2014). Some of these analyses have been able to in some ways 
address the issue of endogeneity in the fertility variable which in many ways moves in tandem 
with other growth determinants. Further attempts to correct for this issue, have used simulation 
approaches as a way of determining the individual channels through which changing fertility 
patterns affect economic growth.  Ashraf, Weil and Wilde (2013) pioneered this method with a 
case study of the potential dividend in Nigeria. They conclude that fertility reduction would raise 
output per capita by 5.6 percent over 20 years and 11.9 percent over 50 years, primarily through 
dependency and labor supply effects channels in the short run, and through dependency, capital 
shallowing, schooling and fixed factor congestion in the long-run (Ashraf et al. 2013). Karra, 
Canning and Wilde (2015) incorporating five additional channels find that the additional channels 
almost triple the effect of fertility decline on income per capita, with a 30.9 percent increase in 
income over 50 years and a 14.2 percent increase over 20 years.  
Education has been a fairly common input in most empirical specifications of the 
dividend. Some have analyzed the impact of education, as a whole, on fertility and the dividend. 
Others have identified female education specifically as a key driver of fertility decline, and a 
catalyst to a dependency ratio that produces a demographic dividend (Bongaarts 2008; Skirbekk 
and Samir 2012). Recent analysis of the role of education in the demographic dividend includes 
work by Lutz and Samir (2011) who showed that holding education-specific fertility rates constant, 
different scenarios of future school enrollment trends can result in a difference exceeding 1 billion 
in projected world population by 2050. Lutz et al. (2008) used new data to illustrate two distinct 
mechanisms through which education influences economic growth find that the direct productivity 
effect is particularly strong for older workers with secondary education, while younger workers 
with tertiary education have the greatest effect on the speed of total factor productivity growth. 
Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2014) highlight the fact that early research on the demographic dividend 
either did not consider education in-depth or found the education effect to be insignificant. 
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Estimating a macroeconomic growth model also using new human capital data, they conclude 
that after correcting for educational expansion, the effect of population age structure on GDP per 
capita is reduced significantly, implying that the demographic dividend is in fact mainly an 
education effect. Expanding on Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2014), Renteria et al. (2016) further 
explore the education dividend by linking education attainment to the evolution of the population 
age structure. Combining demographic information with the age profiles of consumption and labor 
income (estimated following the National Transfer Accounts (hereinafter NTA) method), they 
decompose the growth in the support ratio – the demographic dividend – into two different 
components – age and education in Mexico and Spain, and find positive age effects which align 
with previous results obtained for the same countries just looking at the demographic support 
ratio.  
These econometric and simulation models have been able to successfully demonstrate 
that there is a very strong relationship between the fertility transition and economic growth; 
occurring through fertility itself, or through a series of channels key among which is education. 
However, none of these studies have examined the effects of the current state of stalling fertility 
identified in some countries, on any of these channels or on the overall dividend. In this chapter, I 
will use a conventional econometric approach to model the relationship between demographic 
dynamics and economic growth in seven mid-transition sub-Saharan African countries. 
Incorporating other standard determinants of growth, I extend previous studies by; 1) exploring 
the effect of stalling fertility on GDP per capita growth, 2) innovate on conventional estimates of 
support ratios used in most growth equations that confine working age to the 15 to 64 age 
bracket, and use new NTA data to estimate support ratios; re-establishing the effect of a 
changing age structure on income per capita, and 3) explore the relative effects of other key 
variables such as education; particularly female and cohort education on income per capita, given 
stalling fertility decline. 
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1.2 Data, Definitions and Methods 
1.2.1 The Data 
My sample of countries includes; Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Senegal, and South Africa. These were chosen because they vary widely in terms of their geo-
political landscape, and their economic and demographic transitional history. These are also the 
only sub-Saharan African countries for which NTA data has been generated.  
GDP and fertility data are from the 2015 revision of the UN World Population Prospects 
(WPP). Life expectancy, population growth and education data are from the most recent version 
of the Population and Human Capital Stock data provided by the Wittgenstein Center for 
Demography and Global Human Capital (WICD). Investment data is from the IMF 
Macroeconomic and Financial database, and my urbanization and natural resource data are from 
the World Bank databank.  
Profiles of effective producers, effective consumers and support ratios used in my growth 
model are estimated using NTA data. NTA age profiles of consumption and production are 
generated using data from a wide variety of sources including household surveys, administrative 
data and national accounts data. Please see the United Nations National Transfer Accounts 
Manual for full details on the construction methodology (UN, 2013). It should be noted here that 
NTA age profiles are produced for one year only, and as such are cross-sectional in nature. In 
addition the base-year for each cross-sectional profile of production and consumption differs by 
country. However as is standard with NTA analysis, I have normalized each of the flows for 
comparability by dividing each age profile by the average labor income in the 30-49 age group 
(Please see Appendix Section 1 for details on how consumption and production profiles are 
constructed). 
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1.2.2 The Economic Growth Equation 
Following the methods developed by Barro and Sah-i-Martin (1997), studies of the 
economic growth process and its determinants have relied quite heavily on two primary 
assumptions. The first is that economic growth occurs as each country converges from its original 
position to its steady state. Each country has a maximum level of income per worker attainable. 
This maximum is what is commonly known as the steady-state level of income, and it is 
dependent on each country’s individual characteristics including its geographical features, 
economic policy landscape, institutional quality, education and natural resource endowments 
(among other factors). Variations in these characteristics result in a diversity of attainable income 
levels by country.   
The second assumption implicit in economic growth theory is that differences in potential 
versus actual income achieved by country is a constantly narrowing margin, that converges at a 
constant rate. Therefore, countries are consistently approaching their growth limits. These 
assumptions imply that poorer countries occupy a position further away from its maximum steady 
state in comparison to rich countries. Therefore less-developed economies are likely to proceed 
towards that state at a faster pace. The assumptions also imply that the higher the maximum 
steady-state is, the faster the expected rate of growth given a specific level of initial income. 
I use the standard neoclassical model of economic growth estimated across much of the 
literature, and account for variations in labor supply behavior, and the population of workers 
within the larger population. Starting with a Cobb Douglas production function of the form: 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿1−𝛼𝛼    (1) 
where Y is total output, K is capital, L represents labor, A is total factor of productivity, and 𝛼𝛼 is 
the elasticity of output with respect to capital, I assume that capital stock per worker;  𝐴𝐴 𝐿𝐿�  is 
determined endogenously and assume also that total factor productivity is also determined 
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endogenously. Assuming that these endogenous growth processes converge to a steady-state, I 
write steady-state output per worker as; 
�
𝑌𝑌
𝐿𝐿
�
∗ = 𝐴𝐴 �𝐾𝐾∗
𝐿𝐿
�
𝛼𝛼
                              (2) 
where * labels a variable as having a steady-state value. This steady-state is determined by a set 
of factors  𝑋𝑋 , which are generally thought to influence both total factor productivity and capital 
accumulation. Hence;  
𝑦𝑦∗ = 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋                                             (3) 
where 𝑦𝑦∗ is steady-state income per worker and 𝑋𝑋 is a vector of variables that impact steady-
state levels of total factor productivity and capital development. These variables often include 
measures of geography and climate, strength of human capital, policies and institutions and 
natural resource endowments. As explained above, the regression I derive from this model is built 
on the assumption that the actual levels of income per worker are the result of slow adjustment 
from an initial lower level to a steady-state based on;  
𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦 =  𝜆𝜆(𝑦𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑦)                              (4) 
where 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦 is the growth rate of output per worker,  𝑦𝑦∗ is the steady-state level of the log of income 
per worker, 𝑦𝑦 represents the lagged level of log income per worker and 𝜆𝜆 is the rate of 
convergence towards the steady-state. As I stated previously, this equation implies that a 
country’s growth rate is proportional to the initial distance from its steady-state initial income 
level (𝑦𝑦∗), and that the poorer a country is relative to its steady-state, the faster its growth can be 
expected to be.  Adding a random error to the equation (in the context of SSA capturing variation 
relating to factors such as stochastic weather shocks or ethnic conflict), and substituting  (𝑦𝑦∗) in 
the equation leads to: 
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𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦 =  𝜆𝜆𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 − 𝜆𝜆𝑦𝑦 +  𝜀𝜀  (5) 
While this equation forms the foundation of most empirical growth studies, it is developed 
in terms of income per worker. Most empirical studies operationalize growth equations in terms of 
income per capita. Simple neoclassical modeling calls for a simple substitution of income per 
capita for income per worker, because these models assume that every individual in the 
population is a worker. If this is indeed the case, substituting income per capita for income per 
worker will make no real difference. However, in their 1998 study, Bloom and Williamson also 
show that this assumption only holds for stable populations where the age structure of the 
population does not change. In reality this is not often the case, and it certainly is not the case in 
the present sample of sub-Saharan African countries. Populations undergo transitions, and the 
proportion of workers relative to the rest of the population evolves over time. In this case, 
assuming a stable population by substituting income per capita for income per worker will not 
work. 
Therefore, following the lead of Bloom and Williamson (1998), Bloom et al (2000) and Bloom et 
al. (2007), I specify a model that accounts for age-structure effects. This allows for the use of 
output per capita as the key unit of analysis in place of output per worker. I arrive at: 
𝑌𝑌
𝑁𝑁
=  𝑌𝑌
𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿
𝑁𝑁
    (6) 
where 𝑌𝑌 is output, 𝑁𝑁 is the entire population, and 𝐿𝐿 is labor. Taking natural logs of both sides of 
equation 6, I arrive at: 
𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 = 𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙 + log (𝐿𝐿 𝑁𝑁� )   (7) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 is the log of output per capita, 𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙 is log of output per worker, and 𝐿𝐿 𝑁𝑁�  is worker per 
capita. Re-arranging Equation 5, we can then substitute it into this equation to arrive at the growth 
rate of income per capita (where g denotes growth rate): 
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𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦 =  𝜆𝜆𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 − 𝜆𝜆𝑦𝑦 +  𝜀𝜀  (5A) 
𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 =  −𝜆𝜆𝑦𝑦�  + 𝜆𝜆 log�𝐿𝐿 𝑁𝑁� � +  𝜆𝜆𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 −  𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀  (8) 
It is important to mention here that this model is somewhat limited because it is structured 
in a way that assumes that causality runs in one direction; from population growth to income 
growth. However as discussed in Section 1 of this paper, there evidence which suggests the 
possibility of the reverse, i.e. that income growth does in fact have an effect of population growth. 
Previous studies have corrected for this problem by using lagged values of working-age 
population growth and total population growth. I take this approach a step further by substituting 
working age and overall population growth with lagged estimates of the growth in effective 
producers (L) and consumers (N) in the population. I generate these values using newly available 
NTA data for all 7 sample countries, and substitute the lagged growth estimates in the equation 
(see appendix for detailed calculations of NTA age profiles of production and consumption). 
These lagged estimates of effective producers and consumers incorporate new methods of 
estimating working age versus dependent population shares, and provide a proxy measure of 
growth that closely predicts the actual measure. Specified in this manner, they are immune to the 
problem of causality as growth is effectively estimated before it occurs. These lagged estimates 
of growth also work well as predictors because of the slow-moving nature of the variables.  
The key variable of interest in this analysis is the variable capturing the stall in fertility 
decline. Also of interest are the separate and independent effects of overall population growth 
(measured as the growth in effective consumers), and labor force growth (measured as the 
growth in effective producers), both of which are estimated using new NTA data. The effect of 
education given stalling fertility decline is also of interest. I use a random effects (RE) model to 
estimate the impact of fertility stall levels on economic growth across my seven sample countries, 
and across six 5-year time intervals from 1990-1995 through 2015-2020 (projected).  This model 
choice allows me to explore the impact of fertility stalls on GDP growth over time. Even more 
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important, an RE model allows me to control for variations not only within-country but also 
between countries, and draw inferences at the population level. Specified as; 
𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = ∝ + 𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝             (9) 
my RE model estimates the impact of the changing pace of fertility decline i.e. fertility stall levels (𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝), on my dependent variable; GDP per capita growth (𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝), when stall levels 
change across time and between countries. This model also accounts for the separate, 
independent effects of a series of conventional growth determinants relevant within the African 
context  (𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝). These include initial levels of income per capita, FDI investments, natural 
resource rents, urban population growth and conflict. Education by gender and for cohorts 20-39 
and 40-64 is also included. Key demographic variables accounted for in the model include; the 
natural log of the ratio of effective producers to consumers, the lagged growth rates of effective 
producers and consumers, and life expectancy as a proxy for the health status of the population. 
𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 controls for the between-country error or variation, and 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 controls for the within-country error. 
Both are uncorrelated with both my dependent and independent variables, but could potentially 
impact my dependent variable. 
1.2.3 The Fertility Stall Variable  
The methods and definitions utilized in recent literature to identify the presence (or 
absence of stalls) have varied considerably. Researchers agree that fertility decline can only stall 
in countries where the fertility transition has begun i.e. mid-transition countries. Therefore, an 
analysis of stalling fertility should only consider mid-transition countries in which there has been a 
“some” measurable decline in fertility (Howse, 2014). Where there is a lack of consensus is in the 
categorization of mid-transition countries, and in the rate of decline sufficient to constitute a stall.  
Bongaarts (2008) categorizes countries as pre-transitional if TFR is greater than or equal 
to 5 births per woman. Shapiro (2008) on the other hand extends his definition of mid-transition 
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countries to include those that are in what he calls as “early transition” state with TFR between 
5.5 and 6. Machiyama (2010), states that a country is pre-transitional unless there has been a 
decline of at least 20 percent from the highest observed fertility.  
Here, I follow a widely accepted empirical rule that categorizes a mid-transition country 
as one that has experienced sustained fertility decline from a pre-transitional maximum; this is 
defined as a 10 percent decline in TFR from its maximum pre-transitional fertility level (Gerland, 
Biddlecom, and Kantorová, 2016). Every country in my sample can be categorized as a mid-
transition country on the basis of this definition. 
The earliest definition of stalling fertility was by Gendell (1985) who states that a country 
only experiences a stall in fertility decline if it has begun a decline that is followed by a stop or a 
“substantial deceleration”. He defined a substantial deceleration as one that is at least half of the 
rate in the preceding period for five or a minimum of four years. Bongaarts (2008) defines a stall 
in fertility decline as a lack of “significant decline” in fertility in the most recent inter-survey period. 
According to him, this would be a decline that is significantly different (p<0.05) from zero. Shapiro 
in his 2008 and 2010 papers simply defines a state of stall as when TFR does not decline across 
two period measurements. Shapiro (2008; 2010), states simply that a stall occurs if TFR fails to 
decline across two measurements. Moultrie (2008) and Garenne (2008a), follow a different 
approach. Using three waves of DHS data to establish that there has in fact been a fertility 
decline, they use linear regression to test for a significant change (p< 0.05 level) in the slope of 
the line between observations. They define a stall as a period during which the slope changes 
from negative i.e. fertility decline to zero or positive. 
To test the effect of stalling fertility decline on GDP growth, I first determine TFR change 
across each 5-year time period between 1990 and 2015. I then generate a continuous stall level 
variable on a scale of 0-8. The stall level is at its lowest (0), when TFR change is <=-1 i.e. if the 
average number of children a woman decreases by 1 child or more. Ranking each stall level in 
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increments of 0.25 child per woman, the stall level is at its highest (8) when the TFR change is 
>=1 i.e. if the average number of children per woman increases by 1 child or more.   
 
 
1.3 Results and Analysis 
 
1.3.1 A Snapshot of the Fertility Transition Across Sample Countries  
Table 1 provides descriptive data on the fertility transitional status of my sample of 
countries. As stated in Section 1, all the countries in the sample have achieved mid-transitional 
status defined as a 10 percent decline from the highest TFR prior to the onset of the fertility 
transition. There is significant variation however, in the duration of time taken to achieve this 
status. Where it took Kenya and Senegal 15 years to experience a 10 percent decline in TFR 
from pre-transitional levels, it took Mozambique 30 years to achieve the same, Ethiopia and 
Ghana took 20 years to achieve a 10 percent decline, and Nigeria -- 25 years.  
That being said, the period during which this status was achieved is also important. The 
date at which the highest TFR was recorded across the sample countries varied from as early as 
1960 in South Africa to 1980 in Ethiopia, and what is most interesting to note here is that while 
Ethiopia recorded its highest fertility during a period much later than other countries in the sample 
(1980-1985 in Ethiopia compared to 1965-1970 in Mozambique for example), Ethiopia was able 
to achieve mid-transitional status 10 years earlier than Mozambique. This is testament to the 
exceedingly varied nature of the transition unfolding across countries in SSA; even among those 
within the same region. On average however, my sample of countries reach mid-transitional 
status ca. 1990. With this is in mind, I begin my assessment of stalling fertility decline from the 
period 1990 through 2015. This allows me to capture only the effects of fertility stalls within this 
period; removing the confounding impacts of the late onset of fertility decline.  
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Table 1: Snapshot of Sample sub-Saharan African Countries 
  
Highest TFR prior to 
onset of fertility decline 
Length of time between highest 
TFR and 10% decline 
Pace of decline - Highest TFR change 
between 5-yr periods 
Country 
2010-2015 
TFR Period TFR Period TFR 
Years to 
decline Period TFR 
TFR 
Change 
Eastern Africa 
         Ethiopia 4.59 1980-1985 7.42 2000-2005 6.13 20 2005-2010 5.26 -0.87 
Kenya 4.44 1965-1970 8.11 1980-1985 7.22 15 1990-1995 5.57 -0.97 
Mozambique 5.45 1965-1970 6.60 1995-2000 5.85 30 1995-2000 5.85 -0.27 
Southern Africa  
       South Africa 2.40 1960-1965 6.10 1970-1975 5.47 10 1990-1995 3.34 -0.66 
Western Africa 
         Ghana 4.25 1965-1970 6.95 1985-1990 5.88 20 1990-1995 5.34 -0.54 
Nigeria 5.74 1975-1980 6.76 2000-2005 6.05 25 1990-1995 6.37 -0.23 
Senegal 5.18 1975-1980 7.45 1990-1995 6.35 15 1995-2000 5.78 -0.57 
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The pace of decline among these countries also paints an interesting picture. While some of the 
countries within the sample have achieved a fertility decline high approaching 1 child per woman 
(Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa), and other have made significant progress towards this high 
(Ghana and Senegal), the highest TFR decline between 5-year period in Nigeria and 
Mozambique as of the early to mid-1990s was -0.23 and -0.27 respectively. The pace of decline 
in both countries has slowed since then, and is not expected to peak until the 2020-2025 period 
during which TFR change in Nigeria and Mozambique is expected to reach only around -0.34 and 
-0.33 respectively. 
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 2, I provide descriptive means for each of the countries in my sample across all 
the variables in my model. Mean GDP per capita is highest in South Africa ($4,804); the most 
developed economy in the sample, and in Nigeria ($1,120); the most resource endowed country 
in the sample. Following the logic behind the neo-classical model employed in this analysis, the 
growth rate in income per capita is expected to be higher in poorer countries than in richer, and 
this is exactly the case here. With the highest recorded mean GDP per capita growth of 4 percent 
in Ethiopia which also has the lowest mean GDP per capita. The reverse is the case in South 
Africa where income per capita is highest and mean GDP growth rate is lowest. As expected, 
natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP is highest in Nigeria; largely a consequence of 
petroleum endowments. A history of conflict is most apparent in Ethiopia where incidents of 
conflict for most of the 1990s culminated in a full-scale war with Eritrea in 1999.  
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Table 2: Sample Means & Percentages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variable Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Mozambique Nigeria Senegal S. Africa 
GDP per capita growth (%) 4.0 2.7 1.1 4.3 2.6 1.0 0.5 
Base year GDP per capita 272.4 707.9 667.3 322.2 1120.3 744.1 4804.2 
FDI inflow (% of GDP) 2.1 4.6 0.9 11.7 3.0 1.9 1.2 
Natl resource rents (% of GDP) 19.5 12.4 4.1 11.5 25.6 3.9 5.1 
Urban pop. growth (%) 4.7 4.0 4.4 4.0 4.5 3.3 2.6 
Conflict (1=YES) 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 
Male (20-39)-Primary Ed (%) 45.3 15.2 31.5 25.8 24.3 25.8 25.3 
Male (20-39)-Sec Ed (%) 9.8 47.2 56.0 19.7 37.7 13.7 65.5 
Male (40-64)-Primary Ed (%) 24.7 12.7 41.0 21.5 28.3 15.7 38.8 
Male (40-64)-Sec Ed (%) 3.2 36.3 32.7 8.5 15.3 10.2 39.8 
Fem (20-39)-Primary Ed (%) 25.2 15.7 34.0 15.7 25.0 22.7 23.3 
Fem (20-39)-Sec Ed (%) 5.8 36.5 48.8 10.0 24.5 8.8 67.2 
Fem (40-64)-Primary Ed (%) 6.3 11.2 35.3 6.8 21.5 11.2 39.8 
Fem (40-64)-Sec Ed (%) 0.8 20.7 16.8 2.3 6.8 4.3 36.2 
Support ratio 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.7 
Growth-effective producers (%) 16.0 16.9 20.2 12.6 13.2 16.2 12.8 
Growth-effective consumers (%) 15.5 14.5 16.4 12.4 13.5 15.3 9.8 
Life expectancy 55.1 61.4 56.0 48.5 49.2 57.2 55.3 
Stall level (0-8) 1.0 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.7 1.8 2.5 
Observations 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
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Education levels vary significantly across countries and cohorts. Ethiopia has the highest 
mean percentage of primary educated males between ages 20 and 39 (45%), South Africa has 
the highest percentage of secondary educated men in the same age group (65.5%), Kenya has 
the highest mean percentage of primary educated older men age 40-64 (41%), while South Africa 
again has the highest mean percentage of secondary educated older men age 40-64 (39.8%). 
This pattern changes somewhat among women in the sample with Kenya recording the highest 
mean percentage of primary educated women in the younger cohorts (34%), however South 
Africa continues to dominate in the other three cohort and educational categories with Ghana and 
Kenya close behind. Males are invariably more educated than women with larger gaps in Ethiopia 
and Mozambique, smaller gaps in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. 
Considering the demographic variables as a whole, the support ratio here is estimated as 
a ratio of effective producers to consumers. The closer the ratio is to 1, the more producers there 
are in the population relative to consumers. Considering the mean support ratio and the mean 
growth in effective producers and consumers together, it is quickly apparent that countries 
experiencing similar levels of growth in producers and consumers have a higher support ratio 
than those with a higher rate of growth in the level of effective producers relative to consumers. 
For example in Kenya, the mean growth in the effective producers (20%) exceeds mean growth 
in effective consumers (16%) by 4 percent. Kenya’s mean support ratio of 1 is significantly higher 
than that in Nigeria where there is very little difference in the growth rate of effective producers 
(13.2%) relative to consumers (13.5%).  
Mean life expectancy at birth is lowest in Mozambique (48.5 years) and Nigeria (49.2 
years). This is again not surprising since these are the countries with the highest TFRs and 
transitional dynamics dictate that TFR decline follow mortality decline. Also not surprising are the 
mean average fertility stall levels for Mozambique (2.3 out of 8) and Nigeria (2.7 out of 8) relative 
to other countries in the sample which are between 1 and 1.8. Note here that South Africa also 
shows an average stall level of 2.5. This is due to the fact that by the sample period, South 
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Africa’s fertility transition was much further along than the other sample countries, and as a result, 
the magnitude of change in fertility between periods was relatively smaller.  
1.3.3 The Effect of Stalling Fertility Decline on Economic Growth in SSA – Results 
In Section 1, I outlined the growth model which I use to estimate the effect of stalling 
fertility decline on GDP per capita growth across countries and across time. Controlling for an 
extended set of independent variables and accounting for random variation both within and 
between countries, my key variables of interest are stalling fertility (a continuous measure 
between 0 and 8 with zero being the lowest level of stall), the separate and independent effects of 
education by sex and cohort, and a set of demographic variables demonstrating the added effects 
of mortality and evolving age structure on economic growth. Following a nesting approach, I test 
four different models including additional variables in each new model; examining the effects of 
each new variable included while assessing any change in the effect of the variables carried over 
from the previous model. The results of my analysis detailed in Table 3, show that there is a 
consistently negative, statistically significant relationship between stalling fertility decline and 
GDP per capita across all models. 
Model 1 show the results of my most parsimonious random effects model specification, 
and the results show that a one percent increase in FDI inflows, natural resource rents and urban 
population growth across periods and between countries, has an positive effect on GDP per 
capita growth on average. Conflict on the other hand is shown to have a negative effect on GDP 
per capita growth. While none of the above effects are statistically significant, the same model 
shows that on average, GDP per capita growth increases in each subsequent period relative to 
1990-1995 with the exception of the period 2015-2020, where the effect while still positive begins 
to decline. The independent effects of each time period specified are all highly significant. 
Model 2 includes all the variables in Model 1, and the variable measuring the stall-level. 
The results show that a one-unit increase in stall level across periods and between countries has 
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a negative and statistically significant impact on GDP per capita growth on average. Furthermore, 
once the stall-level variable is included, the positive effect of all period measures on GDP per 
capita remain statistically significant and increase across all periods except the 2015-2020 period 
where it declines by almost 1 percent. Interestingly, the effects of all the other variables in the 
model also increase in magnitude, but remain insignificant. 
Model 3 includes all the variables in Model 2, and accounts for the independent effects of 
education levels among male and females of different cohorts. The results show that a 1 percent 
increase in primary educated males age 40-64 is associated with a statistically significant 
increase in GDP per capita, and the same increase in primary educated females age 20-39 and 
secondary educated females age 40-64, is associated with a positive and statistically significant 
effect on GDP per capita. In this model as well, the inclusion of the education variables results in 
an increase in the average effect of urban population growth and conflict, both of which become 
statistically significant in this model. The effect of the period variables also increase in magnitude 
in all but the 2015-2020 period where the effect of GDP per capita relative to the reference period 
decreases and becomes insignificant. In this model, an increase in stall-level by 1 unit has a 
greater negative effect on GDP per capita than in the previous model, and this effect remains 
highly statistically significant. 
In Model 4, I include key demographic variables, and test the independent effects of 
changes in the prevailing support ratio, growth in the number of producers and consumers and 
life expectancy across time and between countries. I find that a 1 percent increase in the support 
ratio across periods and between countries, is associated with a 2 percent increase in GDP per 
capita growth on average. The same increase in effective workers and consumers is associated 
with a 0.5 percent increase and a 0.8 decrease in GDP per capita respectively. It should also be 
noted here that with the inclusion of these demographic variables in Model 4, the effect of each 
period on GDP per capita growth relative to the reference period declines across all periods. 
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While the average effect of the stall level across time and between countries also declines, it 
remains negative and statistically significant. 
Table 3: The Effect of Stalling Fertility Decline on GDP per Capita Growth in 7 SSA Countries 
(1990-2015) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 
4 
     
Log base year GDP per capita  -0.817 -0.305 -1.332 -1.444 
 (-1.46) (-0.48) (-1.55) (-1.52) 
FDI inflow (% of GDP) 0.016 -0.050 0.030 0.004 
 (0.23) (-0.76) (0.57) (0.07) 
Natl resource rents (% of GDP) 0.053 0.099* 0.080 0.091* 
 (1.37) (2.28) (1.79) (2.15) 
Urban population growth (%) 0.339 0.662 2.777*** 1.907* 
 (0.52) (1.02) (4.09) (2.39) 
Conflict (1=YES) -0.300 -0.752 -2.329** -1.881* 
 (-0.36) (-0.93) (-3.24) (-2.13) 
Period (ref. period 1990-1995)     
     Period=1995-2000 3.061** 3.740*** 4.805*** 4.584*** 
 (2.65) (3.67) (5.85) (5.09) 
     Period =2000-2005 4.186*** 5.819*** 7.821*** 6.277*** 
 (3.54) (5.14) (7.91) (5.58) 
     Period =2005-2010 5.023*** 6.236*** 7.100*** 5.102*** 
 (4.52) (6.15) (8.72) (5.17) 
     Period =2010-2015 5.554*** 6.976*** 7.901*** 5.847*** 
 (4.70) (6.25) (7.81) (4.84) 
     Period =2015-2020 4.659*** 3.884*** 1.754 0.728 
 (3.88) (3.40) (1.92) (0.58) 
Stall level (0-8)  -1.153*** -1.905*** -1.545*** 
  (-3.32) (-5.81) (-3.74) 
Education      
     Male (20-39)-Primary Ed (%)   -0.545*** -0.425*** 
   (-5.47) (-3.37) 
     Male (20-39)-Sec Ed (%)   -0.304 0.138 
   (-1.73) (0.47) 
     Male (40-64)-Primary Ed (%)   0.351* 0.360* 
   (2.48) (2.45) 
     Male (40-64)-Sec Ed (%)   -0.384 -0.677 
   (-1.48) (-1.85) 
     
     Females (20-39)-Primary Ed (%)   0.247* -0.006 
   (2.03) (-0.05) 
     Females (20-39)-Sec Ed (%)   0.151 -0.080 
   (1.01) (-0.43) 
     Females (40-64)-Primary Ed (%)   -0.220* -0.177 
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   (-2.20) (-1.76) 
      Females (40-64)-Sec Ed (%)   0.621*** 0.519* 
   (3.54) (2.08) 
     
Log Support ratio    2.037 
    (0.68) 
Lagged growth rate: effective 
producers 
   
0.526 
    (1.69) 
Lagged growth rate: effective 
consumers    -0.778 
    (-1.83) 
Life expectancy at birth    0.440* 
    (2.38) 
Constant 1.930 -1.236 9.500 -6.483 
 (0.32) (-0.19) (1.28) (-0.57) 
Chi2 42.310 57.759 167.730 214.429 
Observations 42 42 42 42 
t statistics in parentheses 
Random Effects Models with Country & Year effects 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
1.3.4 Discussion of Results 
The results in Model 1 demonstrate the effects of some of the key conventional growth 
determinants on GDP per capita growth within the African context. It is useful for demonstrating 
how some of these effects play out independently without accounting for demographic dynamics. 
FDI inflows and natural resource rents have played a significant role in the development story of 
every country in this sample; a role that is more significance in countries like Nigeria and Ghana, 
relative to others. Urban population growth often positively associated with economic growth 
across most of the literature also shows a similar effect here. All the countries in this sample have 
experienced some form of conflict at various points in time. Some countries like Ethiopia and 
South Africa were plagued by long periods of sustained strife, while others like experienced 
relatively short-lived albeit violent conflict. The negative impact of conflict of various forms is well 
documented and it is no surprise that the same effect emerges across all four models. 
One of the primary motivations of this chapter was to test the effect of decelerating 
fertility decline on GDP per capita. Models 2 through 4 test this relationship, and results clearly 
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demonstrate that stalling fertility has a negative, statistically significant effect on GDP per capita 
growth. It is however also interesting to note that the results from Model 2 similar to Model 1, 
show that GDP per capita growth in each period increases relative to the reference period (1990) 
even after accounting for stalling fertility decline. However, also as with Model 1, this increase 
does not persist through the last sample period (2015-2020) during which the positive effect on 
GDP growth relative to 1990 is about 50 percent lower than in the previous period. In fact the 
increase in GDP per capita growth over time in Model 2 (which controls for stalling fertility) 
exceeds the increase in Model 1 in all time periods relative to 1990-1995, except in the 2015-
2010 period. In Model 2, the positive effect GDP per capita growth in 2015-2020 relative to 1990-
1995 is over 1 percent lower than in Model 1. These patterns suggest two things. First, that GDP 
per capita growth may be sustained in the short term in the face of stalling fertility decline (as 
evidenced by increasing GDP per capita growth in each subsequent period in Models 1 and 2). 
They also suggest that while positive GDP per capita growth over time may not initially be 
mediated by the negative effects of stalling fertility decline, it is only a matter of time. Also, as 
evidenced by Models 1 and 2, the effects of a decelerating fertility transition will eventually over 
time, exert downward pressure on economic growth. 
The results from Model 3 demonstrate the independent effects of education levels among 
male and females of different cohorts. It is surprising to see some of the negative effects that 
emerge among male cohorts. However, focusing primarily on the female cohort education 
variables, in Model 3, the results do show an expected positive, significant effect of education on 
GDP per capita growth, among all female cohorts with the exception of primary educated females 
age 40-64. While, the negative effect of stalling fertility increases in this model, this indicates that 
this negative effect is driven by variables other than female education. That being said, the results 
do show a positive and highly statistically significant relationship between GDP per capita growth 
and the percentage of secondary educated females age 40-64, and among primary and 
secondary educated women age 20-39. These results are very much in line with the findings from 
Lutz et al. (2008) where the direct productivity effect of education on growth were particularly 
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strong for older workers with secondary education. These results are therefore in line with 
literature on the topic which highlights the benefits of secondary education especially among 
women. These results also indicate rising returns to education among younger cohorts across all 
levels compared to returns experienced by older cohorts.  It is also interesting to note here that 
the positive effects on GDP per capita growth in the 2015-2010 period relative to 1990-1995 are 
even smaller in this iteration and no longer statistically significant indicating that a good deal of 
the growth in this period is driven by education. 
The most significant takeaway from Model 4 is that with the inclusion of demographic 
variables accounting for the effects of a changing age structure and life expectancy, the negative 
effect of stall-level declines even though it remains statistically significant. This indicates that 
gains derived from a rising support ratio i.e. growth in effective producers relative to consumers, 
and mortality gains mediate some of the negative effects of stalling fertility decline. This model 
also shows that changing demographic dynamics are also responsible for some of the positive 
period effects from prior models—which while still highly significant, decline in Model 4. 
Furthermore, in some instances, the positive impacts of the demographic variables (support ratio 
for example) exceed those of the education variables. In essence this iteration of the model 
confirms that demographic dynamics still have an important role to play in the dividend story even 
after accounting for “competing factors” like education, and “mediating factors” like stalling fertility 
decline. 
 
1.4 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
There are a number of key determinants of the fertility transition, which have held true 
across time and spatial context. These determinants in many ways hold true in SSA today, and 
are essential contributing factors if the region is to achieve the demography dividend. That being 
said, it is also true that the fertility transition and its implications for economic growth and 
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development, seems to be following a unique and varied path in SSA, and that certain 
associations previously established as given in other geographical and temporal contexts, may 
require further examination before they can be wholeheartedly ascribed to SSA. One such 
relationship is the correlation between stalling fertility decline and economic growth. This study 
set out to; 1) explore the effect of stalling fertility on GDP per capita growth, 2) use new NTA data 
to estimate support ratios and determine the relative size of the producing versus consuming 
populations thereby re-establishing the effect of changing age structure on income per capita 
growth, and 3) explore the relative effects of other key variables such as education; particularly 
female cohort education on income per capita.  
I have been able to show that having accounted for conventional growth determinants, 
demographic transitional factors and contextual time and spatial phenomena, as well as within 
and between-country variation, there is a persistently statistically significant, negative relationship 
between economic growth and stalling fertility in SSA. The contribution of key economic variables 
to overall economic growth in the region is confirmed by the results here as well. Foreign 
investment and profits natural resource endowments have a consistently significant effect on 
income, and urbanization has a similar effect. This study also confirms the well-researched 
negative relationship between conflict and economic growth.  
Results here document the relationship between income growth and the fertility transition; 
showing that while income may persist along an upward trajectory in the short-term, the negative 
impacts of an interrupted or decelerating fertility transition may dampen these positive growth 
effects in the long-term. Education also has a significant role to play in the growth equation-- 
especially female secondary education which is shown here to have a positive impact on GDP 
per capita growth. Furthermore, there appear to be rising returns to education among younger 
cohorts, despite the negative effects of stalling fertility decline. While results show that a 
significant portion of the growth attributable to some time periods can be attributed to education, 
the demographic variables considered here, are also shown to play a significant part in the 
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growth story among the sample countries. Changing age structures that adjust the number of 
effective producers relative to consumers, are shown here to positively impact income growth and 
mediate some of the negative effects of a stalling fertility transition; more so in fact than cohort 
education.  These results confirms the idea that the demographic dividend is pertinent part about 
demographic dynamics. While education also plays an important role, and while stalling fertility 
declines may dampen the effects of key demographic variables, these variables are still positively 
associated with economic growth. 
So what does this mean for the demographic dividend in SSA? Fertility levels in sub-
Saharan Africa have evolved over the course of the last half-century, and a large proportion of 
countries achieved mid-transition status by the late 20th century. Many countries however, 
continue to maintain high TFR, and even among mid-transition countries, such as those in my 
sample, TFR persists above 4 children per woman. Rates of decline are reportedly decelerating 
in over 60% of mid-transition SSA countries, and as the present analysis and others have 
demonstrated, stalled or decelerating rates of fertility decline SSA constrain GDP growth, and 
may limit the potential for a substantial demographic dividend in the region.  
This analysis is useful because it demonstrates how a series of separate and 
independent factors operate to effect economic growth across a sample of SSA countries, in the 
presence of stalling fertility decline. While previous studies have focused solely on a single 
variable like education or population age structure, this analysis shows that these variables act in 
concert to produce economic growth; which in itself, is constrained by the effects of fertility a 
transition interrupted. Furthermore, this analysis not only illuminates the negative effects of this 
interruption, but also quantifies it.  
In terms of policy, this analysis makes it clear that achieving the demographic divided in 
SSA will require strategic implementation of programs and policies that impact everything from 
trade and investment, to education and employment. This study has been able to show that 
several factors can continue to drive growth, at least in the short-medium term, even in the face of 
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stalling declines. In the long-term however, it would be reasonable to suggest that based on the 
results of this analysis, increased investments in the education, health and well-being of 
populations in SSA could increase the positive effects of these variables on GDP per capita 
growth, and potentially counteract the negative impacts of stalling fertility declines. In a sense, the 
sweet spot in terms of demographic dynamics and economic growth in SSA may be less about 
policy silos and more about collaborative policies that look to accentuate positive effects while 
mediating the negative. This means that while investing in programs that advocate for 
contraceptive use for example, such investment should ideally be accompanied by similar outlays 
directed at human capital development and employment; generating a healthy, skilled workforce, 
and a labor marketplace with the capacity to absorb the burgeoning youth population. 
Despite their difficult histories, SSA countries have proven to be exceedingly resilient; 
with upward growth trajectories that have persisted despite great challenge. Ensuring that the 
region obtains the maximum benefit of its demographic bonus goes beyond a simple single 
solution irrespective of what that solution might be. Rather a consideration for the historical, 
social, cultural and economic contexts, combined with sound, strategic policy can generate the 
sort of growth momentum that will move the sub-Saharan African region many steps closer 
towards the achievement of its demographic bonus. 
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CHAPTER 2                                                                                                                    
AGE-STRUCTURE AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND                                           
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A DECOMPOSITION OF EFFECTS  
 
2.1 Overview 
Bloom and Williamson’s seminal 1998 paper spurred a whole body of literature focused 
on how heterogeneity in population age structures results in a demographic dividend (Canning et 
al. 2015; Bloom et al. 2009; Chandrasekhar et al. 2006; Lee 2003; Bloom et al. 2003; Williamson 
and Higgins, 2001; Bloom et al. 1999). These studies all examine the macroeconomic 
consequences of population change. Additionally, they are also similar in the sense that they 
assess these consequences by constructing a support ratio that is estimated using fixed age 
limits to define the working-age and dependent population.  
However, recent research has begun to show that while the population age structure 
remains important for demographic dividend analysis, the use of these arbitrarily fixed age-limits 
to define the support ratio may be producing inaccurate results. In fact, studies of the first and 
second demographic dividend in Europe have demonstrated that support ratios estimated using 
the fixed age-limits significantly underestimate the effects of population aging. Furthermore, these 
recent studies have shown that in contrast to fixed age limits, the use of age-specific consumption 
and labor market data (National Transfer Accounts data) across geographical contexts, produces 
a more rigorous assessment of the economic consequences of population change (Prskawetz 
and Sambt, 2014; Mason, 2005).  
These new studies have been useful for illuminating the shortcomings of conventional 
fixed age-limit support ratio estimations. However, they have not isolated the individual effects of 
the demographic and economic characteristics of a population on its dividend. Furthermore, these 
studies have been implemented primarily in the developed country context. The few that have 
considered SSA, have mostly conducted aggregate rather than country-specific dividend analysis 
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(Prskawetz and Sambt, 2014). This is particularly problematic given the vast heterogeneity in 
age-structure, economic profile, and the transitional status. 
The goal of this chapter is to close these gaps. Combining National Transfer Accounts 
(NTA) age profiles of consumption and labor with age-specific population projections, I estimate 
and project the support ratio and resulting demographic dividend for the period 1970 through 
2100. I conduct this analysis individually for the 7 SSA countries in my sample (the only countries 
with available NTA data); Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 
and compare results across countries.  These countries make for an interesting comparative 
analysis as they present different contexts in terms of economic profile and demographic 
transitional status.  
In addition, I expand on existing literature by conducting a decomposition of the 
difference in the support ratio components estimated for all the countries except Kenya using 
Nigeria; an early transition country as my baseline. I exclude Kenya from this part of the analysis 
because the NTA production and consumption profiles available for Kenya were estimated using 
data from a much earlier period (1994) compared to that used to estimate profiles for the other six 
African NTA countries all of which were calculated using data from around the year 2005. In this 
portion of my analysis, I first estimate the difference in the support ratio components (effective 
production and effective consumption) between Nigeria and each of the other 5 countries. My 
results highlight the proportion of the difference attributable to the difference in population age 
structure, versus the proportion attributable to the different NTA age profiles of production and 
consumption. This decomposition allows for a more comprehensive view of the component 
contributions of economic behavior (production and consumption) versus demographic behavior 
(mortality and fertility) to the overall dividend. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In 
section 2, I provide a brief overview of relevant literature. This is followed in section 3 by a review 
of my data and methodology. In the final sections I present and discuss my results and policy 
implications. 
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2.2 Modeling the Demographic Dividend in Africa 
Modern demographic dividend literature can in almost all instances be traced back to the 
1998 study by Bloom and Williamson. In this seminal study, the authors used econometric 
models to show that about one-third of the rise in per-capita income in Eastern and Southeast 
Asia occurred as a result of the demographic dividend (Bloom and Williamson, 1998). Following a 
widely accepted standard conditional convergence framework, this study very quickly became the 
foundation for subsequent studies on what is commonly known as the “Asian economic miracle” 
(Mason, 2001; Mason, Merrick and Shaw, 1999). Follow-up studies using macro-level panel data 
further revealed that a population’s demographic characteristics have a strong statistically 
significant effect on overall savings and economic growth (Bloom, Canning and Graham, 2003; 
Bloom and Canning, 2001; Williamson and Higgins, 2001).  
That being said, it quickly became evident that the relationship between age-structure 
variables and economic growth is not a given. Evidence showed that economic benefit derived 
from demographic change is largely dependent on policy. In fact, the Asian growth story was in 
large part a function of export-oriented market strategy sufficient to absorb the burgeoning work-
force. This combined with a stable macro-economic environment paved the way for increased 
local and foreign investment. Demographic change was simply the final piece of the puzzle and 
the result was unprecedented growth across the region (Mason, 2005). 
Emphasis on the policy-dependent nature of the dividend is important, because it 
encourages a more flexible approach to demographic dividend discourse. Where early research 
focused primarily on age-structure, Mason’s (2005) policy-centered approach incorporated new 
methods of estimating population-driven economic growth. Estimating and projecting the first and 
second dividend for countries around the world, he departed from conventional estimates that 
capture the economic life cycle by way of fixed demographic dependency ratios (child and old-
age dependency ratios). Rather he demonstrated how the economic life cycle of production and 
consumption interacts with the age distribution to produce the first demographic dividend. 
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While novel in its approach, Mason’s consideration of the dividend in several regions 
including SSA analyzed the regions in aggregate. His estimates for the magnitude and duration of 
the dividend simple averages of the values for all the countries within each group. Given the 
significant variations in both economic and demographic histories of SSA countries, a more 
comprehensive analysis of individual countries is necessary. Without it, we cannot fully 
understand the different ways in which the dividend unfolds in different countries across the 
region. 
Prskawetz and Sambt (2014) also departed from fixed age-specific demographic 
dependency ratios and applied single years of age-specific economic activities as a way of 
accounting for variations in economic life cycles across countries. As such, they defined the 
dependent and active populations not by fixed age limits but by observed data. Their study 
showed a substantial difference between the conventional support ratio which is estimated using 
arbitrary age-limits and one estimated using actual age-specific production and consumption 
data.  Specifically, they showed that the NTA support ratio in Europe is projected to decline more 
than the conventional support ratio over the next few decades. Although this study introduces an 
important methodological innovation, it may not be generalizable outside the European context. 
Oosthuizen (2015) examines the demographic dividend in South Africa. Like Prskawetz 
and Sambt, Oocsthuizen uses age-specific production and consumption data to explore the 
status of the first dividend in South Africa, and the potential for a more significant second 
dividend. In his analysis he draws attention to the aging South African population which is 
expected to record a rise in median age from 25 to 31 over the next three decades. He also 
points out that the first dividend is well underway despite the persistent effects of apartheid-era 
socioeconomic policies.  What he does not explore however, is the contribution of South Africa’s 
aging population versus the contribution of its age-specific socio-economic profile to the country’s 
unfolding dividend. This study will close this gap. 
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2.3 Data, Methodology and Sample Description 
2.3.1 Population Data 
To project the support ratio and demographic dividend, I use the most recent version of 
the Population and Human Capital Stock data from the Wittgenstein Center for Demography and 
Global Human Capital (WICD). The data includes projections for all African countries and covers 
the period 1970 through 2100. The projections through 2100 are based on census and survey 
data, and the data is provided on the basis of a number of what-if scenarios that allow the user to 
assess population developments over time if certain criteria are met (K.C and Lutz 2017). This 
analysis utilizes data from the Population Component of Medium (SSP2) scenario. This is defined 
as the middle of the road scenario and the most likely path for each country. 
In Table 1, I provide a brief description of my sample countries which include; Nigeria, 
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, Ghana and South Africa. I focus on these countries for a 
variety of reasons; first these are the only countries for which NTA data is available. Second, 
each country in my sample has a unique demographic, political and economic history, and while 
all seven countries have begun their demographic transitions, each country is at a relatively 
different stage. Some like Mozambique and Nigeria are at an early stage and others like South 
Africa are at a relatively late stage. The fertility transition specifically has also occurred quite 
differently across most of the countries. The onset of fertility decline is generally measured by the 
achievement of a 10 percent decline in fertility from the highest TFR recorded. Table 1 shows that 
each country arrived at this 10 percent mark at different periods in time. All these variations allow 
for a rich comparison of the dividend among countries that are in many ways quite 
demographically unique.  
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Table 1: Sample of sub-Saharan African NTA Countries 
 
Country 
TFR  
(2005) 
Total 
Fertility 
Rate 
TFR 
(2015) 
Fertility Transition History Infant 
Mortality 
Rate  
per 1000 
(2015) 
GDP 
Per 
Capita 
(2015) 
Highest TFR prior to 
onset of fertility decline 
Length of time between highest TFR 
and 10% Decline 
Period TFR Period TFR 
Years to 
decline 
Nigeria 5.91 5.74 1975-1980 6.76 2000-2005 6.05 25 69.4 2640 
Mozambique 5.62 5.45 1965-1970 6.60 1995-2000 5.85 30 56.7 529 
Ethiopia 5.26 4.59 1980-1985 7.42 2000-2005 6.13 20 41.4 619 
Kenya 4.92 4.44 1965-1970 8.11 1980-1985 7.22 15 35.5 1377 
Senegal 5.15 5.18 1975-1980 7.45 1990-1995 6.35 15 41.7 900 
Ghana 4.29 4.25 1965-1970 6.95 1985-1990 5.88 20 42.8 1370 
S. Africa 2.55 2.40 1960-1965 6.10 1970-1975 5.47 10 33.6 5,724 
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2.3.2 Life cycle Production and Consumption Data 
I use National Transfer Accounts (NTA) data to construct age profiles of production and 
consumption. The NTA framework focuses on what Lee and Mason (2011) describe as the 
generational economy. This generational economy is defined as; “(1) the social institutions and 
economic mechanisms used by each generation or age group to produce, consume, share, and 
save resources; (2) the economic flows across generations or age groups that characterize the 
generational economy; (3) explicit and implicit contracts that govern intergenerational flows; (4) 
the intergenerational distribution of income or consumption that results from the foregoing’’ (Lee 
and Mason, 2011).  
Following from this definition, there are four main activities that bring about this 
generational economy; working, consuming, sharing and savings (Mason and Lee 2011). They 
need not all occur simultaneously. Consumption occurs throughout the entire lifecycle at a level 
that varies by age. Working occurs only at certain ages and generally excludes the very young 
and very old. Due to their inability to work, the very young and very old primarily survive by way of 
sharing and savings.  
NTA simply quantifies the value of these various activities at each individual age. The 
relationship between each activity is captured by the following equation; 
𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼 +  𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴 +  𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔+ +  𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓+ = 𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽 +  𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔− +  𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓− (1) 
Where 𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼 is labor income, 𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴 is asset income, 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔+, 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔−, 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓
+ and 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓
− are transfers to (-) and from (+) 
the government (g) or family (f), 𝐶𝐶 is consumption and 𝛽𝛽 is savings.   
Rearranging, the NTA is the following identity; 
𝐶𝐶 − 𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼 = 𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴 − 𝛽𝛽 +  𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔+ −  𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔−  + 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓+ −  𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓− (2) 
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In essence, the left-hand side of Eq. 2, also called the Life Cycle Deficit, estimates excess 
consumption. It is financed by asset-based reallocations and net transfers, and the relationship 
holds true at the individual, age-cohort and aggregate levels (Mason and Lee 2011). Using this 
information to estimate support ratios abandons pre-defined age cut-offs and incorporates age-
specific differences in specific economic behavior such as labor market participation and 
productivity. It also captures consumption behavior at different ages.  
Construction of NTA profiles incorporates data from a wide variety of sources including 
household surveys, administrative data and national accounts data. Please see the United 
Nations National Transfer Accounts Manual for full details on the construction methodology (UN, 
2013).  
2.3.3 Estimating the Support Ratio and Demographic Dividend 
The support ratio is in-essence, an indicator that captures how resources are allocated 
within the NTA’s generational economy. Also commonly called the “economic” support ratio, it 
specifies the relationship between those who support the economy and the consumption 
requirements of the entire population.  
The demographic dividend depends on the rate at which the support ratio changes. Both 
the dividend and the support ratio are estimated by combining NTA age profiles of income and 
consumption with age-specific population projections. NTA age profiles of labor income and 
consumption have only been estimated for a single year. Therefore, projections of the support 
ratio and demographic dividend are based on the assumption that the forces that determine labor 
income and consumption behavior (such as labor force participation, productivity and 
unemployment rate) do not change over time.  
The demographic dividend has been formalized in Mason and Lee (2006). If those who 
support the economy (also called effective producers) are denoted by L and the entire population 
of consumers (effective consumers) is denoted by N, then;  
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𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝛽𝛽) ∙ 𝛾𝛾(𝛽𝛽)𝑝𝑝              (3) 
𝑁𝑁(𝛽𝛽) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝛽𝛽) ∙ 𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽)𝑝𝑝             (4) 
Where 𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝛽𝛽) is the population aged a at time t, 𝛾𝛾(𝛽𝛽) represents NTA age-specific variations in 
productivity, and 𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽) represents age-specific variations in consumption. The L and N estimated 
here are the essential components of the support ratio and demographic dividend estimations. 
As stated in section 2.1, the demographic dividend is driven by the notion that a 
transition-driven bulge in the population generates a higher relative proportion of people at 
working age at a certain point in time. This increase in the working-age population has a 
demographically driven positive effect on income per capita. Therefore income (Y) per capita at 
time t can be given as; 
𝑌𝑌(𝑝𝑝)
𝑁𝑁(𝑝𝑝) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑝𝑝)𝑁𝑁(𝑝𝑝)  ∙  𝑌𝑌(𝑝𝑝)𝐿𝐿(𝑝𝑝)   (5) 
where L and N represent the number of effective producers and consumers respectively, L/N  is 
the support ratio and Y/L  is productivity.  Eq. 5 suggests that an increase in income per capita 
can be achieved by an increase in productivity or an increase in the support ratio produced by an 
evolving population age structure.  
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides and the derivative with respect to time, Eq. 2 
can be expressed in terms of growth rates so that; 
𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽) = 𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) −𝑁𝑁(𝛽𝛽) +  𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙(𝛽𝛽)  (6) 
Therefore, the growth rate of output per capita (𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛) is the sum of the growth rate of the support 
ratio (𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) −𝑁𝑁(𝛽𝛽)), and the growth rate of productivity (𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙). The demographic dividend, is the 
portion of the rate of change in output per capita  (𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛) that is attributable rate of change in the 
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support ratio. The dividend is positive (i.e. has a positive effect on (𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛), when the number of 
effective producers (L in Eq. 3) exceeds the number of effective consumers (N in Eq. 4). 
2.3.4 Decomposing the Support Ratio 
As pointed out in section 2.1, this chapter will add to current literature on the 
demographic dividend in Africa by decomposing growth in the support ratio into the portion 
explained by population aging and the portion explained by age-specific variations in production 
and consumption.  
NTA data on age-specific profiles of production and consumption is only available for one 
year. Therefore, a decomposition of changes in the support ratio components within the same 
country using the same age-specific NTA profiles across all years will not show much variation in 
the results. With this limitation in mind, I capture the effect of changing production and 
consumption profiles, by decomposing the difference in the support ratio components between 
countries. This is particularly interesting because all the countries in my sample are at different 
stages in their demographic transition, and each have age compositions that differ significantly. 
For example, Nigeria is a country with a very young population, and is the country at the earliest 
stage in its demographic transition. These characteristics, make Nigeria the most appropriate 
baseline comparison country in my sample. As of 2004; the period represented by the NTA data, 
Nigeria’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) was 5.13. South Africa on the other hand is well beyond 
transition; with a much older population and a TFR of 2.31 as of 2005. All the other countries fall 
somewhere within this spectrum. This variation in age structure combined with each unique age-
specific profile of production and consumption will demonstrate how aging versus economic 
behavior, contribute to the difference (growth) in support ratio components estimated for each 
country.  
To operationalize my decomposition, I recall the support ratio component equations from 
section 2.3.3. However, since I am comparing the support ratio components between countries 
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rather than between time periods, I express the equations in terms of country (c) rather than time 
(t); 
 𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥) ∙ 𝛾𝛾(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝑝𝑝               (3) 
𝑁𝑁(𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥) ∙ 𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝑝𝑝              (4) 
Beyond demonstrating how age structure and age profiles of production and consumption interact 
to produce effective producers and consumers, this expression is particularly useful for this 
decomposition analysis because it demonstrates how changes in population age structure affect 
effective producers and consumers at a specific time.  I then utilize Horiuchi, Wilmoth and 
Pletcher’s (2008) line-integral method of decomposition to determine the difference in effective 
producers and consumers between my baseline early-transition country Nigeria (designated as 
𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼) and all the other countries in my sample (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Senegal, Ghana and South 
Africa designated as 𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸;  𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀;  𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁;  𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺;  𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 respectively). The estimation is expressed as; 
𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼) − 𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) =  �� 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝑃𝑃(𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)𝑃𝑃(𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝=1 +  �� 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿(𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)
𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥
𝑝𝑝=1
           (7) 
𝑁𝑁(𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼) − 𝑁𝑁(𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) =  �� 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁(𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥) 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝑃𝑃(𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)𝑃𝑃(𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝=1 + �� 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁(𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥)          (8)𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)
𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥
𝑝𝑝=1
  
The first integral estimates the contribution of changes in the proportion of the population in each 
age group a while the second estimates the contribution of changes in the age-specific profiles of 
production and consumption for age group a.  
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2.4 Mapping the Demographic Dividend in 7 sub-Saharan African Countries 
2.4.1 The Evolving Age Structure 
As shown in Section 2.3, Table 1 of this chapter, the NTA countries in my sample are 
relatively heterogeneous in terms of geographical location, economic status and demographic 
transitional status; with a higher total fertility rate (TFR) and infant mortality rate (IMR) indicating 
early demographic transitional status and vice versa.  
Figure 1, displays the projected age structure of the countries considered in this paper for 
the years 1970, 2000, 2050 and 2100. Although all 7 countries have very different demographic 
histories, as of 1970, their age structure profiles were somewhat identical. In 2000, the 
demographic transition in South Africa was well underway, and fertility decline in the country 
brought about a significant decline in the share of the population under the age of 15 from over 15 
percent to roughly 11 percent. This decline was matched by an increase in the share of the 
population at working ages. This change is largely responsible for the country’s demographic 
dividend which is estimated to have begun as early as 1975 (Oosthuizen 2015). There is also an 
overall downward shift in the population below age 15 across the other 6 countries. Although the 
shift is not as stark as South Africa’s, Ghana is also starting to break away from the pack. A shift 
in the share of the population at reproductive age is however not yet quite evident in the other 
group of countries by 2000. 
By 2050, it is projected that the proportion of the population below age 15 will be well 
below 10 percent across all countries except Nigeria. Nigeria is the country projected to have the 
highest fertility rate by 2050 (UN, 2013). The share of the population at productive ages is 
expected to increase across the board and by 2100, at which time the proportion of the 
population at old ages is expected to increase mostly in South Africa and Ghana accompanied by 
a decline in the share of working age population. 
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Figure 1: Age structures in African NTA Countries 
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2.4.2 The Life Cycle Deficit: Age Specific Production and Consumption by Country 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 present the age profiles of production, consumption and the life-cycle 
deficit for all 7 SSA countries in my sample. These are the only SSA countries for which the NTA 
data is available. It should be noted here that the NTA age profiles are produced based on data 
from one year only and as such are cross-sectional. In addition, the base-year for each cross-
sectional profile of production and consumption differs by country. However as is standard with 
NTA analysis, each of the flows has been normalized for comparability by dividing each age 
profile by the average labor income in the 30-49 age group. 
 
Figure 2: Labor Income Profiles for Africa NTA Countries. 
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The steep increase in the labor income at ages below age 20 indicates early entry into 
the workforce in Senegal, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Youth in the other four countries tend to 
enter much later with the latest entries occurring in Nigeria and South Africa. Labor market exit is 
much earlier in South Africa and Mozambique than in any of the other countries as indicated by 
the steep decline in income at higher ages. Senegal on the other hand retains a relatively high 
income at older ages indicating a much later exit from the labor force. 
 
 
 
40 
 
  Figure 3: Consumption Profiles for Africa NTA Countries. 
 
 
Age profiles of consumption presented in Fig 3. show strong declines in consumption at 
older ages in Mozambique, Nigeria and South Africa. The sharp decline in Kenya is simply due to 
the absence of data at ages after 82. Consumption at later ages does not fall as rapidly and in 
some cases rises (Ghana). This disparity is likely due to weak inter-household and public transfer 
systems that are not set up to maintain the consumptions levels of the elderly. Across all 
countries (except South Africa), consumption levels among the 20 to 30 age group are much 
higher than at any other age. This is generally explained by household composition. There is a 
lower likelihood for children to reside in the homes of younger adults between age 20 and 30, 
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than in the homes of older, married adults. Fewer people in the household results in the allocation 
of certain fixed consumption categories to fewer individuals thereby increasing per capita 
consumption levels. 
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the key takeaway from this chapter. Conventional support 
ratio analysis places entry and exit into the workforce i.e. productive activity between the ages of 
15 and 65, and elevated consumption at ages preceding 15 and above 65. The dashed horizontal 
lines superimposed in Figure 2 show a rise in productive activity in Senegal, Mozambique and 
Ethiopia prior to age 15, and continued productive activity across all countries in the sample well 
past the age of 65. Furthermore, Figure 3 demonstrates that while consumption after the age of 
65 remains elevated, consumption after 65 is in all cases exceeded by consumption between the 
ages of 20 and 40. This is a result that runs contrary to conventional estimates which arbitrarily 
set consumption levels at their highest before the age of 15 and after the age of 65. This analysis 
clearly demonstrates that accounting for economic activity across the entire life-cycle captures 
information about productive behavior that would otherwise be lost or poorly estimated if 
conventional methods of determining the support ratio are followed. 
The life-cycle deficit mapped in Fig. 4 is the difference between consumption and labor 
income (𝐶𝐶 − 𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼), and is largely driven by the age profile of labor income. It is negative (i.e. not at 
a deficit) when income (Y) exceeds consumption, and positive (i.e. at a deficit) when consumption 
exceeds income.   
There is a negative i.e. no life cycle deficit for 43 years in Senegal (from ages 28 to 70). 
During this time, income exceeds consumption. This is also the case for 29 years in Ghana (from 
age 37 to 65). All the other countries fall somewhere in-between with a surplus of income for 37 
years in Kenya; 31 years in Mozambique and Nigeria and 30 years in Ethiopia and South Africa. 
These numbers are consistent with year of entry and exit from the labor force. Entry and 
exit into the labor force is indicated by labor income levels in Fig. 2 above. Given the elevated 
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income levels at very early and very late ages in Senegal, it is not surprising to see that Senegal 
is one of the first countries to depart from a positive to a negative life cycle deficit, and the last 
country to return to a positive deficit. Ghana and Nigeria on the other hand show positive life 
cycle deficits for longer period due to late entry into the workforce as indicated by lower income at 
early ages. 
Figure 4: Life-Cycle Deficit for African NTA Countries. 
 
2.4.3 The Projected Support Ratio and Demographic Dividend in sub-Saharan Africa 
The support ratio for Kenya and Senegal in 1970 started at around 0.9 effective workers 
per effective consumer as shown in Figure 5. At the far end of the spectrum was Ghana which 
started out at a little less than 0.5. The other countries in the sample all started somewhere 
between 0.6 and 0.75.  
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                         Figure 5: The Support Ratio                            Figure 6: Demographic Dividend 
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Given the advantage Kenya and Senegal had over the rest of the countries in the 
sample, it would be expected that the dividend in these two countries would exceed the dividend 
in the others in the decades that followed. However, while Kenya did experience sharp increases 
in the dividend between 1970 and 2000, the same was not the case in Senegal. In fact, Figure 6 
shows that between 1970 and 1981, Senegal did in fact experience declining dividends. After 
1981, the pace of growth turned positive and began to increase but not at the rate shown for 
Kenya. It should be noted here however that the NTA data used to estimate Kenya’s support 
ratios are from 1994. This is the only data available for the country and may present a picture that 
does not match up as well with that of the other countries which have NTA data from around the 
same period (2004/2005). 
Support ratios level off between 1995 and 2010 in most countries, and in in the same 
period the demographic dividend also shows a sharp decline across all countries except Ghana, 
Nigeria and Ethiopia. This decline was likely due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic which ravaged most 
of East and Southern Africa during the same period; carrying off large numbers of the young 
working age-population. A combination of preventative and treatment initiatives targeted at 
mitigating the effects of the epidemic, brought about a decline in the prevalence and mortality 
rates among within this key demographic. In fact, according to a 2013 special report issued by the 
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the number of AIDS related deaths in SSA 
in 2011 was 33 percent less than that in 2005, and the number of new HIV infections in the region 
in the same year was 25 percent less than the number in 2001 (UNAIDS 2012; 2013). 
The support ratio and dividend are predicted to continue to rise through 2030 across 
most countries in the sample. The first declines in the dividend are expected in South Africa and 
Ghana around 2031. This is not surprising given the fact that these two countries are the furthest 
along in the demographic transition. Nigeria on the other hand is not expected to record declining 
dividends until around 2080. This is also not a surprising outcome. Dividends in Nigeria do not 
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peak and level off until 2060 which is when the massive younger cohorts will begin to age out of 
the workforce.   
 
2.4.4 Decomposing the Key Components of the Support Ratio 
Table 1 quantifies the contribution of differences in the population age structure and 
differences in age-specific production to overall effective producers (L). The comparisons in the 
table represent the differences between the baseline country (Nigeria) and the other countries in 
the sample. I do not include a comparison with Kenya in this section of the analysis. I exclude 
Kenya because the NTA profiles for Kenya are produced with data from 1994 while those for the 
other countries in the sample are produced with data from 2004/2005. I decided that the time 
difference was too large to allow for an accurate comparison. 
All the countries in the sample exceed Nigeria in terms of their estimated effective 
workforce. Senegal shows the highest difference with at least 14 percentage points more 
effective producers than Nigeria. The workforce in Ethiopia on the other hand is much closer to 
that of Nigeria; exceeding Nigeria’s by only 5 percentage points. The results presented in the 
table is also consistent with the demographic transitional status of all the countries. Ethiopia, 
Mozambique and Nigeria have the highest TFR’s in the sample and all record an average 2004 
TFR of over 5 children per woman. Senegal (4.3), Ghana (4) and South Africa (2.3) on the other 
hand all have relatively lower fertility rates compared to Nigeria (5.13) (see Table 1). 
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Table 2: Decomposition of the difference in effective producers in Sub-Saharan African NTA Countries  
  
Country Comparison                             
(Nigeria vs. Other) 
Effective 
Producers           
(Nigeria) 
Effective 
Producers           
(Other) Difference 
Contribution of Production Rate Contribution of Age Structure 
Absolute Rate 
Contribution to 
the Difference   
Prop. of Total 
Contribution  
Absolute Age 
Contribution to 
the Difference 
Prop. of Total 
Contribution  
        Nigeria vs. Ethiopia 0.282 0.341 0.059 0.066 1.127 -0.007 -0.127 
Nigeria vs. Mozambique 0.282 0.375 0.093 0.101 1.084 -0.008 -0.084 
Nigeria vs. Senegal 0.282 0.428 0.146 0.164 1.125 -0.018 -0.125 
Nigeria vs. Ghana 0.282 0.347 0.064 0.040 0.624 0.024 0.376 
Nigeria vs. S. Africa 0.282 0.374 0.092 0.000 0.003 0.092 0.997 
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Most of the difference between effective producers (L) in Nigeria versus Ethiopia, 
Mozambique and Senegal is due to the age-specific rate of production in these countries. Across 
all 3 comparisons, more than 100 percent of the difference was due to the age-profile of 
production (contributions greater than 100 percent occur when the production rate effect was 
counterbalanced by significant differences in the age-profiles of the populations being compared). 
However, a comparison of L between Nigeria and countries that are further along on their 
transitions, shows a reversal in this trend. Aging begins to factor more into the effective producer 
difference. Comparing the difference in L between Nigeria and Ghana, I find that 62 percent of 
the total difference is due to age-profile of production, while 38 percent is due to the aging effect. 
A comparison of Nigeria with South Africa reveals an even stronger aging effect (99.7%) 
compared to a tiny effect (0.03%) of age-profile of production.  
Figures 7 and 8 map the proportion of the overall difference in effective producers that is 
due to the age-profile of production. Figure 7 which maps the difference between Nigeria and 
Ethiopia; another high fertility, early transition country, show that production between age 20 and 
30 was the primary driver of the difference in the overall rate of production between both 
countries. 
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Figure 7: Age-specific contributions to difference in effective producers between Nigeria and 
Ethiopia 
 
Figure 8: Age-specific contributions to difference in effective producers between Nigeria and 
South Africa 
 
A comparison of the L’s between Nigeria and South Africa on the other hand shows a 
much smaller age-profile of production effect. Where the effect of the difference between Nigeria 
and Ethiopia at age 20 is well over 2 percent, the same effect at the same age when comparing 
Nigeria with South Africa is about 0.2 percent. This further confirms results demonstrated in Table 
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1 which show a much more modest age-profile of consumption effect when comparing two early 
transition countries, relative to a comparison of an early and post-transition countries (please see 
Appendix for Figures 7b-7d; graphing age-specific contributions to the difference in effective 
producers between Nigeria and the other countries in the sample). 
Table 3 shows the contribution of differences in the population age structure and 
differences in age-specific consumption to overall effective consumers (N). Again, using Nigeria 
as the baseline, I find that all the countries in the sample exceed Nigeria in terms of effective 
consumers. Some of the differences here are not as large as those reported in table 1, with only a 
0.2 percentage point difference between effective consumers estimated for Nigeria versus for 
Senegal. Effective consumers in Ghana exceed those estimated for Nigeria by 18.5 percentage 
points. This is the largest difference reported in the table.  
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Table 3: Decomposition of the difference in effective consumers in Sub-Saharan African NTA Countries  
  
Country Comparison                             
(Nigeria v. Other) 
Effective 
Consumers           
(Nigeria) 
Effective 
Consumers  
(Other) Difference 
Contribution of Consumption Rate Contribution of Age Structure 
Absolute Rate 
Contribution to the 
Difference   
Prop. of Total 
Contribution  
Absolute Age 
Contribution to 
the Difference 
Prop. of Total 
Contribution  
        Nigeria v. Ethiopia 0.482 0.514 0.032 0.037 1.161 -0.005 -0.161 
Nigeria vs. Mozambique 0.482 0.537 0.055 -0.004 1.070 -0.004 -0.070 
Nigeria vs. Senegal 0.482 0.484 0.002 0.008 3.933 -0.006 -2.933 
Nigeria vs. Ghana 0.482 0.667 0.185 0.170 0.919 0.015 0.081 
Nigeria vs S. Africa 0.482 0.553 0.070 0.024 0.337 0.047 0.663 
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Similar to Table 2, the age-profile of consumption is largely responsible for the differences 
reported in Table 3. The only exception to this conclusion is in South Africa where 66 percent of 
the total difference is due to aging. The results presented in the Table 3 are also consistent with 
the demographic transitional status of all the countries. While there is larger proportion of people 
at older ages in South Africa, causing an increased aging effect, the same is not the case in some 
of the early transition countries. Rates of consumption in the younger economies are not driven 
by a high concentration of people at ages with a propensity for higher age-profiles of 
consumption.  (Please see Appendix for Figures 10 and 11 – which graph the aging and age-
profile contributions to effective producers and consumers). 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The results of this chapter suggest that that the demographic transition in Africa indeed is 
underway. However, it is proceeding at a very different pace across the different countries. This 
has significant implications for estimations for the dividend in the region. Prior studies of the 
demographic dividend in Africa produced aggregate estimates of the dividend by combining data 
across different countries. These studies were sufficient for an overall understanding of the 
dividend in SSA as a whole but provided very little information on the unfolding dividend in 
individual countries. Considering the varying transitional patterns from country to country, this 
presented a significant gap in the literature.  
This chapter closes that gap by providing an analysis of the timing, length and magnitude 
of dividend across 7 SSA countries, demonstrating that while a country like South Africa has 
already experienced a significant portion of its first dividend, countries like Nigeria and 
Mozambique have barely begun. Where the demographic dividend in South Africa is expected to 
last through 2040, the same in Nigeria will most likely continue through 2080, and maybe even a 
little beyond.  
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This analysis has also been able to demonstrate that the dividend is indeed driven by 
age-specific rates of consumption and production, both of which are relatively fluid and vary from 
country to country. Where previous estimates of the dividend use fixed-age profiles to determine 
dependency ratios and age specific production behavior, this analysis departs from conventional 
methods by considering economic behavior outside of fixed age-limits. I show here that 
engagement and departure from the labor force is not always restricted to the 15-65 age bracket. 
Rather labor force participation and production activity begins much earlier in several countries, 
and extends in some instances well into the 70s. These differences are of course driven by a 
variety of institutional factors which I do not consider in this paper, however it is valuable to 
underscore the fact that these differences do in fact exist. 
It is also important to know what drives the differences in effective production and 
consumption used to estimate the dividend. In this paper, I have been able to show that these 
differences are motivated very differently depending on what set of countries is being considered. 
When comparing a demographically advanced country with a younger one, the differences 
effective production and consumption are largely driven by an aging effect i.e. the difference in 
the age-structure of the population. However, when comparing two countries, both of which have 
a higher proportion of people at younger ages (e.g. Nigeria and Ethiopia), the differences in 
effective production and consumption are largely driven by age-specific production and 
consumption rates rather than by population aging.  
It is important to note some limitations of this analysis here. As stated in section 2.3.3, 
because NTA data for each country is only available for a single year, projections of the support 
ratio and demographic dividend here are based on the assumption that the forces that determine 
labor income and consumption behavior (such as labor force participation, productivity and 
unemployment rate) do not change over time. Furthermore, decompositions here are explored 
with the assumption that profiles of economic behavior are independent of the age structure of 
the population. While this study is not focused on exploring this association, this is a relevant 
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point to note. Since the NTA data is not yet disaggregated by gender and education, I am limited 
in my ability to effectively examine how the above effects differ by gender and educational status. 
These are however important considerations especially given the fact that the true value of 
productive activity among women is often not fully captured by the household surveys that inform 
the NTA data. Furthermore, an examination of the education-age specific levels of production and 
consumption will go a long way towards advising policy on the education-driven components of 
the dividend. I have also not explored how variations in the mechanisms that bring about the 
demographic transitions (fertility, mortality and in-migration) play into the projected dividends. 
These mechanisms are unfolding very differently in in each individual country, and even within 
each country, they are occurring in ways that defy expectation. These are areas that merit further 
consideration even as the dividend unfolds in its many forms across the African continent. 
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                                                    
POPULATION PROSPECTS IN MALAWI:                                                                                  
THE EFFECT OF ACCELERATED FERTILITY DECLINE ON THE DEMOGRAPHIC 
DIVIDEND  
 
3.1 Overview 
There are many studies that observe the effect of fertility on economic development—
often measured as growth in GDP per capita. Accounting for the independent effects of 
demographic factors such as mortality and population age structure, this method of analysis 
quantitatively assesses the natural coevolution of fertility and economic development given a set 
of related variables. These studies often specify regression models that are built on the 
assumption that fertility, though operating independently, affects economic growth alongside 
changes in other development-related factors. This analysis can however be taken a step further. 
Holding a series of key growth-related factors constant, it is possible to isolate the effect of fertility 
on its own i.e. quantify the effect on income in a situation where there is an exogenously change 
in fertility versus one where there is a smaller or no change.  
In this chapter, I quantify the effect of an exogenous decline in fertility on economic 
development in Malawi, with a view to assessing the implications of such a decline for the 
realization of a demographic dividend. Very few studies have considered the relationship between 
fertility change and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) on this basis. In two 
separate studies conducted by Ashraf, Weil and Wilde (2013) (hereinafter AWW 2013), and 
Karra, Canning and Wilde (2017) (hereinafter KCW 2014), the authors extend the structural 
approach introduced by Coale and Hoover (1958), and use an economic-demographic macro-
simulation model to study the effect of an exogenous variation in fertility on economic growth. 
Both studies trace the path of economic growth under two scenarios: (1) A “baseline” scenario in 
which fertility falls slowly and is higher (based on the UN 2010 medium-fertility population 
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projection); and (2) An “alternative” scenario in which fertility declines more rapidly and is lower 
(based on the UN low-fertility population projection). In their study, AWW (2013) find that a shift in 
fertility from the medium to low fertility population projection leads to an increase in income per 
capita of 5.6 percent over a 20-year horizon and 11.9 percent over a 50-year horizon. They also 
find that these increases are driven largely by a dependency ratio effect (a decline in dependents 
relative to the working-age population) at shorter horizons, and at longer horizons, the dominant 
drivers are  congestion of fixed factors and capital-shallowing (due to an increase in the number 
of workers). CKW (2014) extend the AWW (2013) model by introducing a set of additional 
channels, and estimate that moving from a medium to low-fertility variant, income per capita 
increased by 14.9 percent after 20 years and 30.9 percent after 50 years.  
Malawi presents a particularly interesting case study because it has, in the last year, 
experienced a change in fortunes in terms of its fertility transition and potential for realizing a 
demographic dividend. The potential for a demographic dividend in Malawi, has up until recently 
been dismissed as negligible, largely due to the slow decline in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) over 
the last 2.5 decades. Beginning with the 1992 Demographic and Health Survey (1992 MDHS), 
TFR declined from 6.7 children per woman to 6.3 children per woman in 2000 to 6.0 children per 
woman in 2004 and to 5.7 children per woman in 2010 (NSO Malawi & ICF International, 2017). 
The demographic dividend is a function of a demographic transition characterized by a 
burgeoning working-age population and a declining dependency ratio resulting from a decline in 
fertility. Despite fertility declines, as of 2014 estimates of the potential demographic dividend 
based on United Nations (UN) population projections for Malawi, were less than promising; with 
fertility declines that were deemed insufficient to produce the age structure necessary to reap 
much of a demographic reward (UNFPA 2017). However, recently released estimates from the 
2015-16 round of the MDHS show an unexpectedly sharp decline in TFR from 5.7 to 4.4 children 
per woman; a decline that exceeds that of the last three DHS rounds combined. This accelerated 
pace of decline is a sharp departure from historic figures, and could potentially change the 
demographic dividend story in Malawi. 
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Graphic 1: Trends in Fertility in Malawi – 3-year TFR prior to survey 
 
Source: NSO Malawi (2017) 
 
Graphic 2: Total Fertility Rate by District in Malawi: 3-year TFR prior to survey 
         
        Source: NSO Malawi (2017) 
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Now, there has been some skepticism surrounding these latest fertility figures, and while 
this analysis is not focused on a micro-level assessment of fertility in Malawi, it is important to 
highlight some key characteristics of the Malawian fertility landscape with a view to providing 
some understanding of where the declines are really coming from. According to DHS 2015-16 
micro-data, there is a great deal of variation in fertility along a variety of parameters. An 
assessment of fertility by residence, shows that women in rural areas have an average of 4.7 
children, compared to those in urban areas who have an average of 3.0 children. As illustrated by 
the map above, fertility also varies widely by district with lowest fertility levels reported in the 
Blantyre district of Malawi (3.4 children per woman), and highest in the Machinga district (6.6 
children per woman). There is also significant variation by education and socio-economic status. 
Women with zero education have 3.2 more children than women with greater than secondary 
education (5.5 versus 2.3). Fertility in Malawi also declines as wealth increases, and the poorest 
women have an average of 5.7 children compared to 2.9 children by the wealthiest. Although in 
this chapter I do not estimate causality or explain how these variations may translate into lower 
TFR in the aggregate, it is important to put the decline in the right perspective, potentially 
demystify the sudden dip and highlight where the decline is largely derived from. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the accuracy of the new TFR figures for Malawi have 
been called into question, recent United Nations World Population Prospects (UN WPP 2017 
Revision) vital rate estimates put 2015 TFR in Malawi at 4.88 children per woman; a slight 
upward revision of the MDHS, but a significant decline nonetheless. Unlike MDHS, UN WPP vital 
demographic rates are produced using a combination of data sources. According to the data 
documentation, estimates of fertility are produced using; (a) maternity-history data from the 1984 
Family Formation Survey, and the 1992, 2000, 2004, 2010 and 2015-16 Malawi DHS; (b) 
estimates from the 2006 MICS, 2012 and 2014 Malaria Indicator surveys, and 2014 MDG Endline 
survey; and (c) estimates derived from the 1977, 1987, 1998 and 2008 censuses (UN WPP, 
2017).  
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Given the recent rapid pace of fertility decline in Malawi it would be interesting to see how 
an economic-demographic model plays out in Malawi and compare economic outcomes as they 
relate to fertility status estimated as of 2014/2015 versus the current fertility status in 2015/2016 . 
In particular, it would be extremely useful to highlight the relative strength of the dependency ratio 
effect on economic growth over time as this has direct implications for a successful dividend. With 
this background, the goal of this chapter is to answer one key question; what is the economic 
effect of the recent accelerated fertility decline in Malawi, and what are the implications for the 
country’s demographic dividend? 
To answer this question, I perform a series of exercises. First, I generate probabilistic 
population projections for Malawi using probabilistic projections of total fertility and life expectancy 
generated by Bayesian hierarchical models (Sevcikova, Alkema and Raftery 2011; Raftery et al. 
2013; Sevcikova and Raftery 2016). Innovating beyond the projections used by AWW (2013) and 
CKW (2017), which are deterministic, my projections assess changes and deviations in 
population quantities from expectations, and incorporate uncertainty into the estimates produced. 
Using this method, I generate population projection estimates with a series of probability intervals 
(25%, 50%, 80%, 90% and 95%). I then compare path of economic development under two 
separate scenarios of fertility decline and population growth; 1) a base case scenario based on 
the 2015 World Population Prospects (UN 2015), and which represents the slow fertility decline 
historically previously observed in Malawi, and 2) an alternative scenario represented by the 
lower-bound of my projected 95 percent probability interval - which represents population growth 
in Malawi with a steeper, accelerated decline in fertility. In both scenarios, fertility is falling. 
However, it is falling at a slower pace under the base case, and this exercise allows for an 
exploration of what the potential dividend in Malawi would have been given the old 2015 WPP 
estimates versus what it could potentially be given the new 2016 DHS data and my use of non-
deterministic, probabilistic projection methods to estimate future fertility and population growth.  
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Next, based on these scenarios, I construct a simulation model which quantifies the 
additional income per capita produced given fertility declines through year 2100 accounting for a 
series of endogenous parameters. This approach also allows me to assess the strength of these 
parameters both in the aggregate and independently. While fertility, mortality and the resulting 
population size and age structure are exogenous, they are assessed alongside a series of effects 
including;  
• Fixed Factor of Production (Malthus Effect) – demonstrating what happens to output per 
capita when fixed factors of production, e.g. land, become more or less congested due to 
population changes. 
• Capital Accumulation (Solow Effect) – illustrating what happens to output per capita when 
capital-to-labor force ratio changes due to an expanding labor i.e. capital shallowing.  
• Dependency Effect (The Demographic Dividend) – the effect of declining fertility on the 
ratio of dependents (age 0-14) to working age adults (age 15-64). Holding income per worker 
constant, declining dependency ratios increase income per capita. 
• Quantity-Quality Effect – declining fertility is associated with increased investment in 
education per child. I show the effect of changing education investment on income per capita. 
• Life-Cycle Labor Supply Effect – the effect of an upward shift in the age structure on labor 
force participation rates and income. Increased rates of participation by older workers 
increases overall labor force participation, which in turn increases income per capita. 
• Experience Effect – the aging effect of slower population growth on the working-age 
population. In developing countries, a more mature workforce results in an increase in 
average experience, which is expected to increase productivity. 
• Time-in-Childcare Effect – declining fertility is associated with a decrease in the quantity of 
adult time spent on childrearing and increased time in other productive activities. 
The rest of the chapter will be structured as follows; in Section 2, I will provide a brief overview of 
literature on fertility change and economic outcomes. Section 3 will provide an overview of (1) the 
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projection methodology, and (2) the economic-demographic model structure and its 
parameterization for Malawi. Section 4 will show the results of my projections and simulations that 
highlight the aggregate effect as well as the relative effects of component channels.  I will 
conclude in Section 5. 
 
3.2 Modeling the Relationship Between Fertility Change and Economic Development 
The demographic transition in Africa is underway. While the pace and magnitude has 
been shown to vary widely from country to country, research over the last few years has shown 
that the region is evolving from a high mortality, high fertility to a low mortality, improved life 
expectancy, low fertility region (Caldwell, Orubuloye & Caldwell 1992). These demographic 
changes are expected to produce a population age-structure dominated by working-age adults 
alongside a declining dependency ratio during the demographic transition. A burgeoning working-
age population combined with smart macro-economic policy in most cases encourages an 
increase in per capita income that is commonly known as a demographic dividend (Bloom & 
Williamson 1998; Bloom et al. 2003; Williamson & Higgins, 2001; Canning et al. 2015).  
Fertility decline has been cited as a key component for a successful demographic 
dividend. With fewer children, families are able to increase the amount of resources allocated to 
each child, thus improving health, education and human capital benefits that accrue over the life-
course (Becker & Lewis 1973; Bloom et al 2010). Fewer births also free up time, particularly for 
mothers to engage in productive, income-generating activity. Higher levels of female labor force 
participation and increased productivity resulting from a better educated, healthier workforce 
invariably increases both savings and investment levels and spurs economic growth (Bloom at al. 
2009). 
Several studies aimed at quantitatively assessing the relationship between the 
demographic transition and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, have emphasized the role of 
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the fertility transition. However, a combination of data and methodological challenges have made 
it difficult to arrive at conclusive empirical evidence of the relationship particularly with regards to 
causality. Studies have shown that the endogenous nature of fertility change make it difficult to 
disentangle its singular effect on economic growth (Becker et al. 1960; Brander & Dowrick 1994; 
Galor & Weil 2000). Some scholars have examined the relationship using instrumental variables 
approaches and unique data sources (Acemoglu & Johnson 2007; Bloom et al 2009; Joshi & 
Schultz 2007; Miller 2010). These approaches have also been criticized for having problems 
associated with endogeneity, and have been viewed as limited in their ability to produce 
estimates of the aggregate effect of fertility on economic growth (Acemoglu 2010). 
Simulation models have increasingly become more popular for their ability to 
parameterize, and interact economic and demographic interrelationships in a way that allows for 
a comprehensive assessment of the effect of demographic changes on economic outcomes 
(Karra, Canning, & Wilde 2017). Economic-demographic simulation modeling has its origin in the 
1958 study by Coale and Hoover where they examine the effect of fertility change in India. Basing 
their scenarios on alternative population forecasts under three exogenous fertility scenarios; high 
(constant at the 1951 level), medium (declining 50% between 1966 and 1981), and low (declining 
50% between 1956 and 1981), they found that total population would be 22 percent higher in the 
high versus the medium scenario and 7 percent lower in the low versus the medium fertility 
scenario. Assuming a constant incremental capital-output ratio, and ignoring human capital and 
fixed factors, they found that at year 30, income per capita would be 15 percent higher in the low 
fertility scenario and 23 percent lower in the high fertility scenario compared with the medium 
scenario. The dominant growth channel in their assessment was capital accumulation; finding 
that high population growth and high dependency ratios negatively impact savings rates, 
investments and economic growth. 
Drawing from the Coale and Hoover model, Enke in 1971 also examined income per 
capita under a high-fertility scenario in which the gross reproduction rate (GRR) stayed constant 
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at 3 between 1970 and 2000 and a low-fertility scenario in which GRR fell from 3 to 2 between 
1970 and 1985, and from 2 to 1.5 by 2000. Using a Cobb-Douglas production function, he divided 
population into 5-year intervals, varying age-specific labor force participation rates and found that 
income per capita in the low-fertility scenario was 13 percent higher than in the high-fertility 
scenario in 1985 and 43 percent higher in 2000. Driving the increase was a higher savings rate in 
the low-fertility scenario. 
Julian Simon (1976), building on Enke’s work, estimated a multi-sector model with 
separate agricultural and industrial sectors. He showed that technological change in the industrial 
sector was a function of population size, and that social overhead capital increased alongside 
population density and improved economies of scale in production. He found that given 
exogenous fertility constant population size led to higher income per capita in the first 60 years 
compared to growing population size. However, in the long term (120 to 180 years), moderate 
population growth rather than constant population, led to higher income per capita, because in 
the long term, the economic burden on families and public facilities is spread out over a longer 
period of time unlike in the short-term. Furthermore, they show that by the 120th year, the average 
worker works at 52 percent capacity in the highest fertility scenario, and at 47 percent in the lower 
fertility variant below. This 10 percent difference compensates for the decrease in capital-per-
worker in the high-fertility variant. 
Simulation models were criticized by some for their complexity, which for some came at 
the expense of sensitivity analysis and proper identification of underlying assumptions. Other 
critics cited general equilibrium feedbacks, policy and institutional instability and the accuracy of 
data and long-range demographic forecasts as significant constraints to robust simulation 
methodology (Ahlburg 1987; Kelley 1988). Recent renewed users of simulation models have 
included new channels including Lee and Mason’s quantity-quality tradeoff channel. In their 2010 
study, they compared a baseline scenario assuming continued decline in mortality and a rapid 
decline in fertility with alternate scenarios that deviated from the baseline with a faster or slower 
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fertility decline from the baseline. They found that in the slow fertility decline scenario, 
consumption per adult-equivalent was about 12 percent lower than in the baseline scenario for 
the first two generations in the simulation (Lee & Mason 2010). 
A key question many simulation models have begun to consider is how household 
consumption and savings decisions, which are often affected by demographic change, are 
affected by expectations of future demographic and economic change. Some models have begun 
to incorporate this phenomenon by modeling utility-maximizing households as constantly 
rearranging their demographic and economic decisions in response to the paths these variables 
are expected to follow (Doepke, Hazan and Maoz 2007). These caveats make for a more 
comprehensive albeit complex simulation exercise. Nevertheless, simulation models remain 
popular primarily for the fact that they allow for the identification of the aggregate effects of fertility 
changes on economic growth while highlighting the strength of individual channels through which 
fertility operates to produce said growth (Enke 1971, AWW 2013; Cole and Hoover 1958; Bloom 
and Canning 2004). 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Probabilistic Population Projections 
The demographic balancing equation is the most widely-used method for predicting 
population 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝 in country c, at time t; 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝 =  𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝−1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝 −  𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝 + 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝     
Where B is the number of births, D is the number of deaths and M is net migration. Solved 
deterministically, this method is usually applied based on the cohort component method 
(Whelpton, 1928) which produces projections by age and sex. Following this methodology, 
traditional UN population projections also use the cohort component method with inputs for each 
country including; sex and age specific population estimates at time 0, projections of TFR, 
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projections of fertility distribution across ages, projections of sex ratio at birth, projections of male 
and female life expectancy at birth, historical sex and age-specific death rates and projections of 
sex and age-specific net migration. For each future period (t), projected TFR is converted into 
age-specific fertility rates, and historical data on death rates is used to produce projected life 
expectancy which is converted in age-specific mortality rates using a variant of the Lee-Carter 
method (Lee & Carter, 1992). To account for uncertainty, the UN produces medium, high and low 
variants which were essentially the main projections, +/- half a child respectively. However, this 
method lacks a true probabilistic basis (Raftery et al. 2012). 
New population projection approaches address this problem by introducing two new input 
components. A large set of TFR trajectories are estimated using a Bayesian hierarchical model 
developed by Alkema et al (2012). An equal number of trajectories of life expectancy are also 
generated using a Bayesian hierarchical model developed by Raftery at al. (2012). These 
trajectories are then converted into age-specific fertility rates using model fertility schedules and 
age-specific mortality rates using the Lee-Carter method. Combined, the trajectories are used to 
produce future trajectories of age and sex-specific population quantities and the resulting values 
are viewed as a sample from a predictive distribution. 
I use this method to generate population projections and select the lower band of the 95 
percent probability interval as my alternative scenario. I generate these projections for all five-
year age groups between 0 and 100+ for each five-year period through 2100. I also generate 
age-specific fertility rates for each five-year period through 2100.  
3.3.2 Economic-Demographic Model 
Production 
Following the method specified in AWW (2013), I estimate production using a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function. Factor inputs include; physical capital, land (which incorporates all 
fixed factors of production), and effective labor, such that aggregate production in period 𝛽𝛽, is; 
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𝑌𝑌𝑝𝑝 =  𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽 
Where 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋 < 1, 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝 is total factor productivity, 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝 is capital accumulation, 𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝 is effective labor 
and 𝑋𝑋  is a fixed stock of land. Assuming relatively standard values for factor shares in the base 
case setup, I set  𝛼𝛼 at 0.3 and 𝑋𝑋 at 0.6 therefore implying that share of land in total output is 10 
percent; assuming constant returns to scale. I verify that natural resource income share for land is 
approximately 10 percent for Malawi (WDI Malawi 2017), and due to a lack of data on the other 
factor values, I assign them based on values used in simulations produced for Nigeria. This value 
is generally based on the role of each factor of production in a specific economy and a 
consideration of the share of land in national income and natural resource shares of national 
income. I also set the growth rate of total factor productivity to zero. Reasonable variations in this 
parameter have been found to have very little effect on the primary outcome. 
Physical Capital Accumulation 
Following Solow (1956), I assume that a fixed share of national income is saved in each period. 
Therefore, the stock of available capital 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝 in any period 𝛽𝛽, is determined over time by; 
𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝+1 =  𝑠𝑠𝑌𝑌𝑝𝑝 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝 
Where 𝑠𝑠 and 𝛿𝛿 are fixed saving and depreciation rates respectively.  I set the annual savings rate 
is 6.84 percent, which corresponds to the most recent (2007) investment share of real GDP for 
Malawi reported by the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten 2009). I set capital 
depreciation rate at 3 percent (Ansu 2012).  
Effective Labor 
An individual’s effective labor here, is a function of age-specific labor force participation rates and 
human capital levels. Human capital level is estimated as a function of both schooling and 
experience. Assuming that human capital inputs of different individuals with different 
characteristics are perfectly substitutable, I estimate the stock of effective labor 𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝 in period 𝛽𝛽, as; 
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𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝 =  � �ℎ𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠 ×  ℎ𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤  ×  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝�𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝
15≤𝑝𝑝<65
 
Where ℎ𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠  and ℎ𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤  respectively, are the level of human capital derived from schooling and 
experience by individuals in the population age 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝛽𝛽,  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝 is their labor force participation 
rate and 𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝 is the number of individuals in the population age 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝛽𝛽. Entry into the labor 
force is set at age 15 and exit at age 64. In reality, exit from the labor force for many Malawians 
does not automatically occur at age 64. The proportion of the labor force above age 64 can be 
estimated using National Transfer Accounts (NTA) production data for Malawi, however this 
exercise is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Returns to Schooling – Years of schooling is incorporated into the human capital 
equation by way of a log-linear specification where; 
𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 =  𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝 
Where 𝜃𝜃 is the estimated return due to an additional year of education. The expectation here is 
that reductions in fertility will cause an increase in the average level of schooling. The relevant 
literature on the subject of returns to education report a range of outcomes ranging from 4.1 to 
20.1 percent with an average of 11.7 percent return in sub-Saharan Africa (Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos 2004), 3.3 to 19.1 with an average of 9.75 percent also in sub-Saharan Africa (Banerjee 
and Duflo 2005), Schultz (2004) found returns to education over a sample of six African countries  
Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and South Africa, Nigeria and Burkina Faso as varying between 2 
and 17 percent with an average of 8 percent. While all the above estimates were derived from 
OLS regressions and criticized as potentially biased due to endogeneity and omitted variables, 
Duflo (2001), utilized a widely-cited quasi-natural experiment in Indonesia which put returns to 
education as between 6.8 and 10.6. Oyelere (2010) following a similar methodology estimated 
regional returns to education in Nigeria to be around 2.8 percent. Across most of the growth 
literature a value of 10 percent is applied, which represents a rough average of all the estimates 
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from the relevant literature (AWW 2013). This is the value I assign to 𝜃𝜃 in my estimation of returns 
from each additional year of schooling for individual age 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝛽𝛽. I also conduct sensitivity 
analysis using the upper bound (20 percent) and lower bound (2.8 percent) estimates reported in 
the literature for sub-Saharan Africa. 
Returns to Experience – To estimate the contribution of on-the-job experience to human 
capital for a worker age 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝛽𝛽, I compute; 
𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤 = ∅ (𝑖𝑖 − 15) +  𝜑𝜑(𝑖𝑖 − 15)2 
Where ∅ represents experience and 𝜑𝜑 represents the square of experience. The expectation here 
is that fertility and mortality decline will result in a population characterized by a higher average 
age and higher average experience. There are very few reliable estimates of returns to 
experience in African countries, and so the values I assign here are derived from one of the few 
reported estimates of returns to experience provided by Bils and Klenow (2000). They provide 
estimates of returns to experience for 52 countries, 4 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya and Tanzania). I use the average of the estimates they provide 
for each of the 4 countries and designate  ∅ = 0.052 and 𝜑𝜑 = −0.0009875. 
Labor Force Participation Rates – Simulations are populated with 2015 labor force 
participation rates for Malawi reported by the International Labor Organization (2013). The 
estimates include all work including, wage work, non-wage work, self-employment and work for 
family enterprise. Total labor force participation rates by age are estimated using age and sex-
specific rates, weighted by the fraction of males and females in each age group.  
Quantity-Quality Effect – The expectation here is that as fertility declines the average 
level of schooling per child rises. Following AWW (2013), I derive an estimate of this relationship 
by drawing on the results of a 2007 study by Joshi and Schultz, of a randomized intervention in 
Matlab, Bangaldesh, which showed an increase of 0.52 years of schooling for males ages 9-14 
as a result of the intervention. This finding is incorporated into the model as follows; TFR in 
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Malawi declines from 4.88 in the 2015-2020 period to 4.49 in the 2020-2025 period. This is an 
absolute reduction of 0.39, which corresponds to a reduction of 7.99 percent. The estimated 
increase in schooling during this period is 0.52 x 7.99/15.0 = 0.28 years. However, following the 
same calculation, under the lower band of the 90 percent probability interval (lower variant 
scenario), fertility falls by 17.3 percent leading to an increase in years of schooling of 0.6 years. 
This demonstrates the greater increase in the years of schooling resulting from a larger decline in 
fertility. 
Childcare Effect – The greater share of childrearing responsibility often rests with the 
mother. Therefore, the assumption is often made that that the fewer children a woman has, the 
more free-time she has available for other productive activity such as participation in the labor 
force. A few studies have been able to quantify the magnitude of the increase in productive 
activity in developed countries but very few studies have been able to do the same in developing 
countries largely because of the way childrearing often occurs in these contexts. It is rare to find a 
woman in a developing country whose sole activity is childrearing, rather women generally take 
care of children while engaging in other activities both leisurely and productive.  
I incorporate the childcare effect in my model by using a parameter called the labor 
market time cost of a marginal child; female labor force participation in each year is increased by 
the hypothesized change in age-specific fertility multiplied by the labor market time cost (in years) 
of a marginal child (AWW 2013). For example, if the age-specific fertility rate for women aged 15-
19 drops from 0.72 to 0.70 between the 2015-2020 period and the 2020-2025 period, and the 
labor market time cost of a marginal child is 1 year, then the labor force participation rate for 
women in this age group will rise by 2 percentage points.  
Very few studies have successfully produced estimates of the labor market time cost of a 
marginal child in a developing country context. Tiefenthaler (1997) estimated that in Cebu, 
Philippines, weekly labor market hours fell from 10.4 prenatally to 5.0 at two months after birth, 
6.6 at six months, and 9.5 at 14 months for women who had other children aged 0–5 in the 
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household (group 1); and from 13.1 prenatally to 7.6 at two months, 11.3 at six months, and 13.8 
at 14 months for those with children aged both 0–5 and 6–17 in the household (group 2). These 
figures yield an average of approximately a 5-hour per week reduction for the first group and 3 
hours per week for the second group in the first year after birth. If weekly hours for men in the 
same households did not change in response to birth and stood at 40 hours per week, this means 
that women in these groups lost about 0.125 or 0.075 years of full-time-equivalent labor market 
input in the first year after birth of an additional child. Newhouse and Wolff (2013) estimate that 
female labor force participation is reduced by approximately 8 weeks (0.154 years) due to 
childbirth in the last 2 years. AWW (2013) put this figure (due to childbirth in the last year) in 
Nigeria at 0.5 years. I utilize the average of both estimates in my model and assign a labor 
market time cost value of 0.33.  
 
3.4 Simulation Results 
3.4.1 Projected Population Pathways in Malawi 
This model illustrates the potentially favorable change in the demographic dividend story 
in Malawi, by comparing economic outcomes derived using deterministic fertility and population 
growth projections reported by in the 2015 revision of the UN WPP, with outcomes derived using 
probabilistic fertility and population projection generated for the purpose of this study using the 
most recent 2016 iteration of the Malawi DHS. My projections of future population scenarios are 
generated using probabilistic projections of future total fertility rate (TFR) and life expectancy. As 
described in Section 3, a large number of trajectories of future TFR and life-expectancy are 
generated and converted into age-specific fertility and mortality rates. Each trajectory is then 
converted into a future trajectory of age and sex-specific population quantities which can be 
viewed as a sample from the predictive population distribution. From this distribution a series of 
prediction intervals are generated including a 95 percent probability interval. The 2015 WPP 
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revisions represent deterministic projected population in Malawi that does not account for the 
unexpected acceleration in fertility decline observed in 2016. In this model, I use these 2015 WPP 
estimates as my medium-fertility population projection/baseline scenario, and the lower band of 
my estimated 95 percent probability interval as my low-fertility variant/alternative scenario. 
Designating 2015 as the present year, I project population by five-year age groups for 
every five-year period through 2100. Figures 1-4 illustrate the paths of population evolution in 
Malawi during this period. Figure 1 illustrates the TFR trajectory over both scenarios, and shows 
TFR starting off at a slightly lower point in the low variant (4.4) than in the medium variant (4.9). 
TFR in the low variant declines at a more rapid pace between 2015 and 2050 after which the 
pace begins to decelerate. The medium variant shows a much more sedate decline during this 
earlier period and after 2050, the difference between the medium and low variant remains 
somewhat steady at 1. 
In Figure 2, I show population trajectories for the medium and low scenarios. Starting out 
at the same level in 2015, the paths begin to diverge in 2030, and as of 2050 there is a 21 
percent difference between population reported in the medium versus low scenario. This 
difference almost triples by 2080. 
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          Figure 1: Projecting Total Fertility Rate in Malawi - Medium v. Low Demographic Scenarios 
 
Figure 2: Projecting Population in Malawi - Medium v. Low Demographic Scenarios 
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Figure 3 shows the difference in working-age fraction of the population (15-64) in both 
scenarios, and Figure 4 shows the difference in the dependent fraction of the population (Below 
15 and over 65) also in both scenarios. The working-age population in both scenarios increases 
at a rapid pace, however there is a clear difference in the pace and magnitude of this increase in 
the low versus medium variant. The percentage of the population at working-age in the low 
variant reaches its peak (70%) in 2070 while in the medium variant, peak working-age population 
does not occur for another 10 years in 2080 and at a lower level (64%). It is also interesting to 
note here how the dependent population evolves over time. In the low variant scenario, 
somewhere around 2091, there is a clear crossover between the young and old dependent 
population, leaving Malawi with a higher percentage of older relative to youthful dependents. This 
means that in the low-variant scenario, the potential medium-term economic benefits of a 
burgeoning working-age population should be contemplated alongside the longer-term 
prospective burden of a large aging population.  
                   Figure 3 - Projecting Working-Age Population Proportions in Malawi - Medium v. Low 
Demographic Scenarios 
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Figure 4: Projecting Young and Old Dependent Population Proportions in Malawi - Medium v. 
Low Demographic Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
3.4.2 The Aggregate Effect of Fertility on Economic Growth in Malawi 
I now consider the economic parameters included in the simulation model. In Figure 5, I 
show how physical capital per worker, income per capita, income per worker, human capital per 
worker and labor input per worker evolve over time, given the designated parameters detailed in 
Section 3. Each line in Figure 5, represents one economic factor and demonstrates the ratio of 
outcomes in the alternative (low fertility – 2016 WPP) scenario to outcomes in the baseline 
(medium fertility – WPP 2015) scenario. On this basis, I find that in the short to medium-term, i.e. 
at a time horizon of 20 years, decline in TFR from the projected medium to low variant results in 
an 10 percent increase in income per capita.  At a longer time-horizon of 50 years, TFR decline 
between scenarios produces a 26 percent increase in income per capita. After the 50-year mark, 
this increase in income per capita produced by TFR decline between scenarios begins to 
decelerate but remains positive.  
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While Figure 5 shows how demographic change affects each of these factors in the 
aggregate, it would be interesting to observe each independent reaction to demographic 
variation. I will note here, however that while this decomposition of relative effects might illustrate 
the independent strength of each channel over time, the impact of each independent channel is in 
many ways dependent on the behavior of the other channels at any point in time. Therefore, to 
account for these interactions, all simulations assess the effects of fertility through each channel 
with the assumption that all the channels in the model are present and operational. However, I 
demonstrate the economic effect of each individual channel by comparing a case in which fertility 
operating through all channels (including the channel of interest) i.e. the base-case, to a case in 
which fertility is operating through all channels but the channel of interest.  
 
                      Figure 5: Base Economic Scenario; Long-run Effect of Fertility Decline from 
Medium to Low Variant in Malawi 
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3.4.3 The Component Effects of Fertility on Economic Growth in Malawi 
Fixed Factor of Production/Land-to-Labor Ratio Effect – In this simulation, I compare the 
trajectory of income per capita in; (1) a base-case in which reduced fertility in the low scenario 
causes a steeper decline in the land-to-worker ratio alongside all the other channel effects 
relative to the medium scenario (baseline), and (2) an alternate case in which reduced fertility in 
the low scenario does not affect the level of land available per worker while retaining the effects 
of all the other channels i.e. land-to-worker ratio is fixed over time even though fertility is 
declining. 
The results of this simulation are shown in Figure 6 which plots income per capita over 
time, in the low relative to the medium variant, for both cases described above. The land-to-labor 
ratio effect also commonly known as the Malthus effect, often takes a long time to emerge. As 
demonstrated in Figure 6, in the base-case, when the land-labor ratio is allowed to vary as fertility 
declines, the effect on income per capita is not apparent for at least 20-25 years post-2015. In 
fact, as of year 2060, which is the mid-point of the time horizon considered here, the difference in 
income per capita in the base-case (24%) (where land-labor ratio varies) is only about 2 
percentage points greater than in the case where the land-labor ratio is fixed (22%). However, in 
the long-term (as of year 80 i.e. in the year 2095), in the base-case when land-labor ratio is 
allowed to vary, income per capita is 32 percent greater in the low versus the medium variant as 
a result of reduced congestion of the fixed factor i.e. land. In comparison, when land-to-labor ratio 
is fixed, the ratio of income per capita in the low relative to the medium variant shows a difference 
of only 23 percent. Therefore, a reduction in fixed factor, or in this case, land congestion over 
time as a result of fertility decline produces a 44 percent increase income per capita over an 80-
year period. 
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   Figure 6: Effect of the Land-Labor Ratio on Income per Capita in Malawi 
 
 
 
Capital Accumulation/Capital-to-Labor Ratio Effect – In the next simulation, I measure the 
importance of the capital shallowing channel also commonly known as the Solow effect. 
Following the same method as that used to demonstrate the Malthus effect, I compare the 
trajectory of income per capita in; (1) a base-case in which reduced fertility in the low scenario 
causes a decline in the level of physical capital per worker ratio, and (2) a case in which reduced 
fertility in the low scenario does not change the level of physical capital available to each worker 
i.e. the physical capital-to-worker ratio is fixed over time even though fertility is declining. 
Figure 7 shows the results of this simulation. Here, variation in the level of physical 
capital available to each worker due to fertility decline, has a larger effect on income per capita 
(24%) as of the year 2060, compared to the effect (19%) with fixed physical capital per worker. As 
of 2095 (at an 80 year time horizon), variation in capital-labor ratio causes an increase in income 
per capita of 32 percent above the baseline, compared to 18 percent when the effect is 
suppressed. 
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
1.30
1.35
1.40
In
co
m
e 
pe
r c
ap
ita
  
(lo
w
- r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 m
ed
iu
m
-v
ar
ia
nt
) 
Variable land-labor ratio  
(base-case) 
Fixed land-labor ratio 
78 
 
 
                          
                             Figure 7: Effect of the Capital-Labor Ratio on Income per Capita in Malawi 
 
 
 
Dependency Effect (The Demographic Dividend) – Next, I compare income per capita in the 
base-case in which I vary the dependency ratio, to the alternative case in which the dependency 
ratio remains fixed in both the low and medium fertility variants. Unlike the first two simulations, 
here in Figure 8, the dependency effect emerges almost immediately. As of 2025 (year 10), 
income per capita is only 1.2 percent above the baseline when the dependency ratio is fixed 
versus 4.3 percent above the baseline when the dependency ratio effect is present. As of 2060 
(the mid-point), income per capita in the base case is 24 percent above the baseline; this is 
almost double the estimated increase in income per capita over the baseline when the 
dependency ratio effect is suppressed (13%).  
             Figure 8 also illustrates a key point of this paper; the window within which this 
dependency effect can potentially produce a demographic dividend. Observe the trajectory of the 
alternate case in which the dependency effect is suppressed, i.e. fertility decline does not change 
the relative proportion of dependent people within the population. In this alternate case, income 
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per capita does not peak but continues to increase through 2100, and it is difficult to estimate 
when, if at all the appropriate window for a dividend occurs without projections that extend 
beyond year 2100. With the introduction of the dependency effect however, it is possible to 
observe via the base-case, that income per capita in the low fertility variant rises at a brisk and 
somewhat even pace through 2065 (increasing by approximately 3% between each period) 
relative to the baseline. This pace continues to be positive but slows down after 2065; increasing 
by only about 2 percent between periods.  The trajectory of the base-case in Figure 8, clearly 
shows that accelerated pace of fertility decline in 2016 (low-variant) relative to the slower pace 
reported as of the 2015 WPP revision (medium-variant), working through the population age 
structure i.e. the dependency channel, has the potential to produce a demographic dividend in 
Malawi, that could potentially last for at least 60 years between the year beginning in 2030. 
 
                     Figure 8: Effect of the Dependency Ratio on Income per Capita in Malawi 
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Quantity-Quality Effect – In Figure 9, I illustrate the benefits to human capital produced by an 
additional year of schooling. As stated in my methods section, I assume in the base case that 
each additional year of schooling produces a 10 percent return. I demonstrate the effect of this 10 
percent return, alongside three alternative levels of return to education; a high return of 20 
percent; consistent with the upper-bound estimates found by Banerjee and Duflo (2005), a low 
return of 2.8 percent; consistent with the lower-bound estimate found by Oyelere (2010), and a 
zero-return scenario in which, consistent with all the prior simulations, the education effect is 
completely suppressed.  
             The first thing to note about the results in Figure 9 is that the education effect takes some 
time to emerge as the cohorts that receive more schooling, still have to age into the labor force 
before the effect of the higher education levels they have acquired begin to generate economic 
benefits. As a result, for the first 35 years from 2015 to 2050, no real education effect is apparent. 
However, by 2050, income per capita in the base case is 19 percent higher than baseline 
compared to 18 percent with a suppressed education effect. As would be expected the upper 
bound (20%) and lower bound (2.8%) of returns produce commensurate increases in income per 
capita relative to the baseline with accelerated increases in at the higher-return bound (40%) at 
year 80 (2095) compared to the base-case (32%), low-return bound (29%) and zero-return case 
(25%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
                                Figure 9: Effect of Returns to Schooling on Income per Capita in Malawi 
 
 
 
Life-Cycle Labor Supply Effect – In Figure 10, I illustrate the base-case in which labor-force 
participation rates vary across age groups over time, to an alternate case in which labor-force 
participation rates are constant. The life-cycle labor supply effect is not quite as pronounced as 
some of the prior effects examined with very little difference between the base and alternate case 
for the first 40 years. As of year 2060, income per capita is only 24 percent above baseline in the 
base-case and 23 percent above baseline in the alternate case. This 2 percentage-point 
difference persists in the long-term through year 80 (2095).  
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         Figure 10 – Effect of Age-Specific Labor Force Participation on  
Income per Capita in Malawi 
 
 
 
 
3.4.4 Decomposition of the Effects of Individual Channels on Economic Growth in Malawi 
             In Figure 11, I show how much each channel contributes to the gain in income per capita 
at each time period in my model. To arrive at these estimates, I compare the level of income per 
capital in each year in the base-case, to the level of income per capita in the same year in the 
alternate case i.e. when each individual channel is suppressed. These individual effects are then 
added up to obtain an estimate of the total effect that ignores interactions between channels. I 
then divide each individual effect by the total estimated effect to produce an estimate of the share 
of total income gain attributable to each individual effect at each time point. 
                Based on the results in Figure 11, the dependency effect is clearly the dominant one in 
the short-term. Fertility operates most strongly through the age-structure of the population to 
produce economic benefit for the first 55 years from 2025 through 2080. It explains at least 60 
percent of the income gain from fertility for the first 10 years, and does not dip below 40 percent 
of the total for at least 35 years. As of the midpoint of this analysis, year 2060, the four dominant 
effects are dependency (41%), capital shallowing (21%), schooling (16%), and the land 
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congestion effect (10%). In the long-tern, as of year 2095, these 4 factors are still the most 
dominant, however capital shallowing (34%) and land congestion (22%) overtake dependency 
(21%) as the most dominant channels. The schooling effect remains a dominant factor at 17%. 
 
 
       Figure 11: Contribution of Each Channel to Gain in Income per Capita in Malawi 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I focus on the question of the effect of fertility change on economic 
development in the context of Malawi with a view to shedding light on the potential for a dividend 
given the country’s present demographic status i.e. the recent accelerated pace of fertility decline. 
In my introductory section, I also motivate my analysis by a desire to move beyond an 
examination of the causal association between fertility and economic growth to an examination of 
fertility as a parameter that produces its own individual, independent effect that is not colored by 
simultaneous variation in other growth factors. In this way, I examine what happens to economic 
growth in Malawi when fertility declines and other key growth determinants are held constant. 
Following well-established methodology prescribed by similar exercises conducted with 
similar motivations, I examine effects not just in aggregate but taking into account the presence 
and absence of key parameters which are all specified on the basis of a solid microeconomic 
foundation. Malawi presents a useful case for this analysis as it has recently experienced a steep 
decline in fertility after decades of a sluggish fertility transition; one that has caused researchers 
and policy-makers alike to dismiss the possibility of a demographic dividend in Malawi as 
inconsequential. The simulation methodology I employ here, allows me to explore the potential for 
a dividend in Malawi in a new light; accounting for the unexpected decline in fertility while 
isolating and highlighting how much future economic growth in the region can be attributed to the 
change in age-structure that will inevitably result from this accelerated fertility transition. 
While previous similar studies have considered a reduction in fertility as the difference 
between the medium and low fertility variants of the UN’s 2010 deterministic population 
scenarios, I innovate on this method by producing my own probabilistic projection population 
estimates accounting for the recent accelerated pace of decline and producing a series of 
probability intervals. I then compare projected economics outcomes under the previously 
released 2015 UN WPP (medium/baseline) scenario which is also deterministic and does not 
account for the recent accelerated fertility declines, with projected outcomes under my 
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probabilistic population scenario which does account for the recent accelerated pace of decline 
(low variant scenario). Taking the ratio of the low-variant scenario and the baseline (medium 
variant) scenario, I find that a reduction in fertility would cause an increase of 10 percent in 
income per capita at a 20-year time horizon and an increase of 26 percent at a longer time-
horizon of 50 years. 
Considering each channel individually, I find that the age-structure effect of Malawi’s 
fertility decline has the strongest effect of future income per capita and this effect will likely remain 
dominant for the 50 years between 2025 and 2075. This highlights not only the idea that there is 
a demographic dividend to be had in Malawi, but that given the recent change in the fertility status 
of the country, the window for the dividend is not very far in the future. Closely related to the 
dependency effect are the childcare and schooling effects that emerge as two other important 
channels for income growth in Malawi; both of which are tied to increased education and 
productive activity due to fertility decline. Capital shallowing and fixed factor congestion also 
emerge as important channels, and overtake the dependency effect in the long-term as having 
the strongest effects on income per capita growth. 
I should note here some important limitations of this chapter. As stated in section 3.1, 
there is some skepticism surrounding the new MDHS TFR figures for Malawi i.e. is the sudden 
sharp decline in TFR a real one or simply due to spurious data. While I have not been able to 
identify any inconsistencies in the micro-data I investigated for this study, I will say here that while 
these results may apply in the aggregate, an important extension of this study will be a micro-
level analysis of these effects as a way of determining is they hold up when assessed with 
household data from a variety of sources other than the MDHS.  
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I conduct an exercise in which I use National 
Transfer Accounts data to estimate the dependency ratio, i.e. I estimate the dependent versus 
productive population as a function of the production and consumption levels at each age rather 
than as a function of fixed age-limits. I believe that there might be some interesting variations in 
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the income per capita outcome if the present exercise is conducted using this alternative 
estimation of the dependency ratio. In fact, it is very possible that the dependency effect here 
might very well be greater if age-specific economic behavior is explicitly accounted for. This will 
form the basis of a very interesting follow-up study. Furthermore, literature on this subject does 
indeed point to some additional channels that can potentially be incorporated in these simulations 
which could also demonstrate greater effects of fertility decline than those reported here. These 
include the effect of fertility on savings, the effect of fertility on health, the effect of market 
imperfections and a model that incorporates more than one sector—preferably one that is 
intrinsically inefficient such as agriculture which is a very dominant sector in the Malawian 
economy.  
Therefore, while the recent acceleration of fertility decline in Malawi will likely result in 
economic benefit, the magnitude of this benefit both at the micro and macro-levels remains 
somewhat open to debate, but given the results demonstrated here, it is safe to say that the 
answer to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, all things being equal, given the 
recent acceleration of fertility decline, as a whole Malawi’s demographic dividend future has 
indeed improved for the better. 
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APPENDIX   
 
Section 1 
Life Cycle Production and Consumption 
I use National Transfer Accounts (NTA) data to construct age profiles of production and 
consumption. The NTA framework focuses on what Lee and Mason (2011) describe as the 
generational economy. This generational economy is defined as; “(1) the social institutions and 
economic mechanisms used by each generation or age group to produce, consume, share, and 
save resources; (2) the economic flows across generations or age groups that characterize the 
generational economy; (3) explicit and implicit contracts that govern intergenerational flows; (4) 
the intergenerational distribution of income or consumption that results from the foregoing’’ (Lee 
and Mason, 2011).  
Following from this definition, there are four main activities that bring about this 
generational economy; working, consuming, sharing and savings (Mason and Lee 2011). They 
need not all occur simultaneously. Consumption occurs throughout the entire lifecycle at a level 
that varies by age. Working occurs only at certain ages and generally excludes the very young 
and very old. Due to their inability to work, the very young and very old primarily survive by way of 
sharing and savings.  
NTA simply quantifies the value of these various activities at each individual age. The 
relationship between each activity is captured by the following equation; 
𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼 +  𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴 +  𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔+ +  𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓+ = 𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽 +  𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔− +  𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓− (1) 
Where 𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼 is labor income, 𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴 is asset income, 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔+, 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔−, 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓
+ and 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓
− are transfers to (-) and from (+)  
the government (g) or family (f), 𝐶𝐶 is consumption and 𝛽𝛽 is savings.   
Rearranging, the NTA is the following identity; 
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𝐶𝐶 − 𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼 = 𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴 − 𝛽𝛽 +  𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔+ −  𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔−  + 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓+ −  𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓− (2) 
In essence, the left-hand side of Eq. 2, also called the Life Cycle Deficit is the excess of 
resources consumed by each group. It is financed by asset-based reallocations and net public 
and private transfers, and the relationship holds true at the individual, age-cohort and aggregate 
levels. Using this information to estimate support ratios abandons pre-defined age cut-offs and 
incorporates age-specific differences in specific economic behavior such as labor market 
participation and productivity. It also captures consumption behavior at different ages.  
Construction of NTA profiles incorporates data from a wide variety of sources including 
household surveys, administrative data and national accounts data. Please see the United 
Nations National Transfer Accounts Manual for full details on the construction methodology (UN, 
2013).  
Estimating the Support Ratio Using NTA Data 
The support ratio is in essence an indicator that captures how resources are allocated 
within the NTA’s generational economy. Also commonly called the “economic” support ratio, it 
specifies the relationship between those who support the economy and the consumption 
requirements of the entire population.  
The demographic dividend depends on the rate at which the support ratio changes. Both 
the dividend and the support ratio are estimated by combining NTA age profiles of income and 
consumption with age-specific population projections. As notes in Section 2, NTA age profiles of 
labor income and consumption have only been estimated for a single year. Therefore projections 
of the support ratio and demographic dividend are based on the assumption that the forces that 
determine labor income and consumption behavior (such as labor force participation, productivity 
and unemployment rate) do not change over time.  
89 
 
The demographic dividend has been formalized in Mason and Lee (2006). If those who 
support the economy (also called effective producers) are denoted by L and the entire population 
of consumers (effective consumers) is denoted by N, then;  
𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝛽𝛽) ∙ 𝛾𝛾(𝛽𝛽)𝑝𝑝              (3) 
𝑁𝑁(𝛽𝛽) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝛽𝛽) ∙ 𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽)𝑝𝑝             (4) 
Where 𝑃𝑃(𝛽𝛽, 𝛽𝛽) is the population aged a at time t, 𝛾𝛾(𝛽𝛽) represents NTA age-specific 
variations in productivity, and 𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽) represents age-specific variations in consumption. The L and 
N estimated here are the essential components of the support ratio and demographic dividend 
estimations. 
 
Section 2 
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Figure 10: Age-specific contributions to difference in effective consumers 
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